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SEEKING DIGITAL REDEMPTION: 
THE FUTURE OF FORGIVENESS 
IN THE INTERNET AGE 
Meg Leta Ambrose,† Nicole Friess,†† and Jill Van Matre††† 
The tendency to use the power of the computer to store and archive 
everything can lead to stultification in thinking, where one is afraid 
to act due to the weight of the past. 
—Liam Bannon1 
 
Abstract 
The “Right to Be Forgotten,” a controversial privacy right that 
allows users to make information about themselves less accessible 
after a period of time, is hailed as a pillar of information privacy in 
some countries while condemned as censorship in others. 
Psychological and behavioral research indicates that one’s capacity 
to forget features of the past—or remember them in a different way—
is deeply connected to his or her power to forgive others and move 
on, which in turn, has dramatic impacts on well-being. Second 
chances and the reinvention of self are deeply intertwined with 
American history and culture. Yet the possibility of a shared 
perpetual memory stored on and accessible through the Internet 
threatens to make it impossible to forget even the most insignificant 
transgression. This article examines whether the march of 
technological progress should retire notions of forgiveness as a social 
value, or if the privacy rights of individuals should include the ability 
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 1. Liam J. Bannon, Forgetting as a Feature, Not a Bug: The Duality of Memory and 
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to move on and afford second chances after information about them 
has been available for a certain amount of time. By analyzing a 
variety of well-established U.S. laws that provide for forgiveness, this 
article proposes a framework for crafting a response to the 
forgiveness void of the Internet Age within the U.S. legal system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 2, 2006, five Amish girls were shot and killed in a 
one-room schoolhouse outside of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.2 The 
Amish community, awash in grief, reacted with forgiveness. 
Unconditional forgiveness is a sacred power for the Amish, and 
because of this, they may not need to forget in order to forgive.3 Yet 
how could anyone forgive an act, no matter how heinous, if they are 
constantly reminded of it? Even the Pennsylvanian Amish 
community, leaning on the strength of their piety, removed every 
trace of the schoolhouse within two weeks of the shooting.4 Some 
degree of forgetting is required to forgive, allowing both the victim 
and wrongdoer, if one exists, to move forward. 
Today, forgiveness has moved out of theological arenas into self-
help books, therapy sessions, neurology labs, twelve-step programs, 
and personal and social aspirations. It has not, however, moved 
online. Due to ubiquitous connectivity and society’s apparent inability 
to disregard gossip-worthy violations of social norms, some 
individuals must “forever” bear their scarlet letters. Pre-Internet 
indiscretions drawn in pencil may soon be carved in stone. As law 
professor and legal commentator Jeffrey Rosen notes, “Around the 
world citizens are experiencing the difficulty of living in a world 
where the Web never forgets, where every blog and tweet and 
Facebook update and MySpace picture about us is recorded forever in 
the digital cloud.”5 The authors of this article know something about 
being college students in a Facebook-obsessed time, long before its 
ramifications were clear. As we watch search engines and social 
networks shift their societal roles, we wonder if forgiveness can and 
should move into the digital age, where information lingers 
indefinitely and restricts individuals to their pasts. 
Theoretical and empirical research tells us that forgiveness 
greatly benefits individuals and societies, but as the tragic events 
 
 2. John Holusha, Students Killed by Gunman at Amish Schoolhouse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/02/us/03amishcnd.html. See also Amish Forgive, 
Pray and Mourn, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 5:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-
201_162-2059816.html. 
 3. See Amish Forgive, Pray and Mourn, supra note 2. 
 4. Martha Raffaele, Site of Amish Schoolhouse Shooting Razed, WASH. POST (Oct.12, 
2006, 7:27 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/12/AR2006101200123.html. 
 5. Jeffrey Rosen, Free Speech, Privacy, and the Web That Never Forgets, 9 J. ON 
TELECOMM. AND HIGH TECH. L. 345, 345 (2011). 
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above suggest, forgiveness is difficult with an ever-present memory 
of the violation. Forgetting is an important part of forgiving. 
Forgetting is also the way in which forgiveness is tied to privacy. 
Information about our pasts can keep us in that past, preventing 
reform and maturation. This notion is embedded into American 
ideology, from migration across the Atlantic to “going West” to 
reinvent oneself. Today, those who have made mistakes, no matter the 
degree of innocence, carry that information around with them—
Google attaches it to their names, and soon their faces. Information 
associated with an individual can limit his or her professional 
pursuits, the interest of potential social ties, the ability to grow, and 
perceptions of self. The threat of an easily accessible permanent 
record may scare people away from pushing the boundaries of 
socially acceptable norms, stunting experimentation and creativity. In 
order to protect and foster autonomy, we must consider the impact of 
restricting individuals’ abilities to move beyond their pasts, free from 
old information. 
A number of European Union member countries6 have reacted to 
scenarios in which an individual is financially, professionally, or 
socially harmed by the easy accessibility of information from his or 
her past. These European nations have established and enforced 
citizens’ Rights to Be Forgotten, which attempts to transform content 
distributed to the public into privately held information and allow 
citizens to move beyond their pasts.7 In redrafting its Data Directive, 
the European Union has also embraced the Right to Be Forgotten, a 
concept we refer to generally as oblivion.8 The United States currently 
 
 6. See generally Franz Werro, The Right to Inform v. the Right to Be Forgotten: A 
Transatlantic Clash (Georgetown Univ. Ctr. for Transnat’l Legal Studies Colloquium, Research 
Paper No. 2, May 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401357 (describing the Swiss right to be 
forgotten as an example of the European approach); see also Lawrence Siry & Sandra Schmitz, 
Online Archives on Trial in Germany: Is There a Right to Be Forgotten? (position paper for the 
26th BILETA Conference, Apr. 11-12, 2011), available at http://www.law.mmu.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/Online-Archives-on-Trial-in-Germany.pdf (discussing the German 
right to be forgotten). 
 7. Siry & Schmitz, supra note 6, at 1; see also Jennifer L. Saunders, Understanding the 
“Right to Be Forgotten” in a Digital World, IAPP (Oct. 15, 2010), 
https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/2010_10_20_understanding_the_right_to_be_f
orgotten_in_a_digital_world (discussing the French right to be forgotten). 
 8. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 9, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 
25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
 
AMBROSE FRIESS VANMATRE 12/10/2012  1:56 PM 
2012] SEEKING DIGITAL REDEMPTION 103 
offers no redress for personal information that has been appropriately 
disclosed. By altering a few small facts in the scenarios that raise 
European rights, these scenarios become eligible for a cause of action 
under one of the four American privacy torts.9 If left unaltered, these 
scenarios are granted no recourse under the U.S. legal system. This 
article challenges that deficiency. 
The first question we address is whether forgiveness, as a social 
value, should be preserved, or rather established, in the digital age, 
when information lasts an indefinite amount of time. The second 
question we address is what a law of, or legal action for, oblivion 
should look like in the legal system of the United States. In order to 
understand how a law can be crafted to promote digital forgiveness, 
we qualitatively analyze a number of United States laws that promote 
forgiveness in some form or another. The analysis of these questions 
proceeds as follows: Part I discusses research on the value of 
forgiveness from a number of disciplines, addressing its relationship 
to memory and privacy. Part II assesses tools to preserve forgiveness 
in a digital age, a time in which it is increasingly difficult to attain 
redemption. Part III surveys the rare instances of U.S. institutional 
forgiveness that have provided for forgiving and forgetting. Part IV 
extracts elements from these U.S. legal mechanisms by performing a 
thematic qualitative analysis. Finally, a framework for Web-
forgiving-and-forgetting is presented that is appropriate for the culture 
and legal system of the United States. 
I. THE VALUE OF FORGIVENESS 
“In the course of human (and nonhuman) history, it is rare 
enough for a significant new regime of recording the past to 
develop.”10 The two most recent are the development of written 
 
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf. While oblivion may suggest notions of 
destruction, death, and nothingness, this article refers to an individual interest in the destruction, 
forgetting, or limited access to personal information when using the term oblivion. The notion is 
related to “practical obscurity,” articulated in U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989). 
 9. The four privacy torts are appropriation (unauthorized use of person’s name, likeness 
or identity for trade or advertising purposes), intrusion upon seclusion (a physical, electronic, or 
mechanical intrusion into one’s private space), public disclosure of private facts (publication of 
non-newsworthy, private facts about an individual that would highly offensive to a reasonable 
person), and false light (publication of false, highly offensive information about an individual). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
 10. Geoffrey C. Bowker, The Past and the Internet, in STRUCTURES OF PARTICIPATION IN 
DIGITAL CULTURE 20, 21 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2007). 
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record practices and the invention of the printing press.11 Pervasive 
computing looks to be another rare new regime of recording the past. 
Law professor Harry Surden challenges those in technology policy to 
consider privacy interests protected by latent structural constraints on 
information, those secondary costs which protect the flow of 
information, before a particular cost-lowering technology becomes 
too widespread.12 Advances in computer storage, content distribution, 
and information filtering have created ubiquitous information 
networks that threaten one’s ability to make mistakes without severe 
consequences—a mark on one’s permanent record, aggregated and 
presented to anyone by Google. If the Internet Age will limit our 
ability to forget, it will in turn limit our ability to forgive or be 
forgiven.13 We must ask whether forgiveness is something to carry 
with us into the future or whether we may leave it behind with analog. 
Forgiveness is a complicated value that has been conceptualized 
and defined in different ways as a response to the memory of 
grievances. Forgiveness is defined as the “willingness to abandon 
one’s right to resentment, negative judgment, and indifferent behavior 
toward one who unjustly injured us, while fostering the undeserved 
qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love toward him or 
her,” by psychology professor and pioneer of the scientific study of 
forgiveness Robert Enright.14 Slightly varied, Fred Luskin, co-founder 
of the Stanford University Forgiveness Project, describes forgiveness 
as the “peace and understanding that occurs when an injured party’s 
suffering is reduced as they transform their grievance against an 
offending party.”15 
While definitions of forgiveness vary, most psychologists agree 
that forgiveness is not forgetting, condoning, excusing offenses, 
reconciliation, re-establishment of trust, or release from legal 
accountability.16 These concepts are related, but do not represent 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. Rev. 1605, 1605 (2007). 
 13. See infra Section I.B. 
 14. Robert D. Enright, Suzanne Freedman & Julio Rique, The Psychology of 
Interpersonal Forgiveness, in EXPLORING FORGIVENESS, at 46, 46-47 (Robert D. Enright & 
Joanna North eds., 1998). 
 15. ROBERT D. ENRIGHT & RICHARD P. FITZGIBBONS, HELPING CLIENTS FORGIVE: AN 
EMPIRICAL GUIDE FOR RESOLVING ANGER AND RESTORING HOPE 292 (2000) (quoting Fred 
Luskin, The Effect of Forgiveness Training on Psychological Factors in College Age Adults 
(1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University)). 
 16. Julie Juola Exline et al., Forgiveness and Justice: A Research Agenda for Social and 
Personality Psychology, 7 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 337, 339 (2003). 
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synonyms or definitions. As demonstrated above, many definitions of 
forgiveness are laden with normative intent. Instead, we utilize a more 
descriptive and general definition of forgiveness. Simplified, 
forgiveness means a decision to forego negative feelings, retribution, 
or vengeance.17 
The broader definition embraces popular understandings of 
forgiveness. When polled, sixty-six percent of American adults found 
the statement “If you have really forgiven someone, you should be 
able to forget what they have done to you,” very accurate or 
somewhat accurate.18 The majority also agreed that if a person is to 
forgive another, he or she must want to release the other from the 
consequences of his or her actions19 and that the relationship should 
be rebuilt.20 These results suggest that despite scholarly attempts to 
precisely define forgiveness as unrelated to forgetting, “many people 
believe that forgiving implies forgetting, reconciliation, or the 
removal of negative consequences.”21 Although the decision to 
relinquish negative feelings toward an individual may satisfy the 
baseline definition of forgiveness, moving forward is the motivation, 
focus, and goal of those engaging in the forgiveness process. In order 
to establish a form of forgiveness in the digital age, it is important to 
recognize popular experiences with, and attitudes toward, forgiveness 
and to bridge those experiences with the described moral value sought 
to be preserved. 
A. Benefits of Forgiveness 
Although legal scholars have not explored digital forgiveness in 
 
 17. See generally Enright et al., supra note 14, at 46-63. Whether forgiveness requires 
positive feelings toward an offender, or whether the absence of negative feelings alone is 
sufficient, is a definitional debate had by social psychologists. Id. The authors consider the 
absence of negative feelings the most important aspect of a definition of forgiveness related to 
this topic. Id. at 50. 
 18. ROBERT JEFFRESS, WHEN FORGIVENESS DOESN’T MAKE SENSE 221 (2000) (thirty-
two percent found the statement very accurate and thirty-four percent found it somewhat 
accurate). 
 19. Id. at 218. When asked about the accuracy of the statement, “If you really forgive 
someone, you would want the person to be released from the consequences of their actions,” 
twenty-eight percent answered the statement was very accurate and thirty-two percent—
somewhat accurate. 
 20. Id. at 220. When asked about the accuracy of the statement, “If you genuinely forgive 
someone, you should rebuild your relationship with that person,” thirty-five percent found it 
very accurate and thirty-eight percent found it somewhat accurate. 
 21. Exline et al., supra note 16, at 340. 
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great depth, in the last two decades scholars in other fields have 
produced an impressive body of literature and empirical study 
demonstrating the benefits of forgiveness.22 The range of benefits can 
be seen in the research area of restorative justice, where scholars in 
forgiveness research have attempted to establish alternatives to 
retribution.23 Scholars of this movement attempt to preserve the rights 
and dignity of victims, as well as offenders, often providing 
opportunities for the parties to meet, communicate, apologize, and 
forgive.24 Although not used for all crimes, restorative practices result 
in participants reporting high satisfaction with the process.25 Victim 
and offender can benefit from restorative processes, while the social 
goal of judicial efficiency is also promoted by forgiveness, as shown 
by research examining how apologies facilitate averting lawsuits.26 
Some perpetrators that acknowledge wrongdoing may experience a 
gratefulness that motivates them to reciprocate goodwill through 
improved behavior and reparations, minimizing repeat offenses.27 
1. Those Who Forgive 
A growing body of research strongly suggests that granting 
forgiveness to others is beneficial in a variety of ways. Individuals 
that received treatment to help them forgive through the Stanford 
Forgiveness Project showed significant reductions in anger, perceived 
stress, hurt, and physical symptoms of stress.28 The Mayo Clinic lists 
six specific benefits to forgiving: healthier relationships; greater 
 
 22. See generally HANDBOOK OF FORGIVENESS (Everett L. Worthington, Jr. ed., 2005); 
Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and Conflict After Divorce, 
43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 441, 446 (2008). 
 23. Exline et al., supra note 16, at 337. 
 24. Id. at 338. 
 25. MARK S. UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION: AN 
ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 183 (2001). 
 26. See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example 
from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 (2000). 
 27. See Brad R. C. Kelln & John H. Ellard, An Equity Theory Analysis of the Impact of 
Forgiveness and Retribution on Transgressor Compliance, 25 PERSONALITY AND SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 864, 871 (1999). For example, following an ostensible transgression, an 
experimenter reacted in one of four ways: forgiveness only; forgiveness and retribution; 
retribution only; or neither forgiveness nor retribution. Id. at 865. Those transgressors that were 
forgiven without any form of retribution complied with experimenters’ requests more than any 
other group. Id. at 869. 
 28. Frederick Luskin, The Stanford Forgiveness Projects, in FORGIVENESS: A SAMPLING 
OF RESEARCH RESULTS 14, 15 (2006), available at 
http://www.apa.org/international/resources/forgiveness.pdf. 
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spiritual and psychological well-being; less anxiety, stress and 
hostility; lower blood pressure; fewer symptoms of depression; lower 
risk of alcohol and substance abuse.29 Being unforgiving can be a core 
component of stress associated with decreased mental health and 
increased levels of guilt, shame, and regret.30 
Particularly relevant are studies on the physical and emotional 
impact of rehearsing hurt and harboring a grudge. Once hurt, people 
both intentionally and unintentionally rehearse memories of the 
painful experience.31 In this state, individuals remain in the role of the 
victim and perpetuate negative emotions associated with rehearsing 
the hurtful offense.32 Nursing a grudge perpetuates the adverse health 
effects associated with anger and blame.33 Generally, releasing a 
grudge “may free the wounded person from a prison of hurt and 
vengeful emotion, yielding both emotional and physical benefits, 
including reduced stress, less negative emotion, fewer cardiovascular 
problems, and improved immune system performance.”34 One study 
examined the emotional and physiological effects rehearsing hurtful 
memories or nursed grudges compared with cultivating empathic 
perspective and imagining granting forgiveness; it revealed dramatic 
benefits to forgiving.35 Feelings of valence, control, and empathy 
were all experienced to a greater degree during forgiving imagery 
exercises than when participants rehearsed painful experiences, which 
ignited significantly more negative feelings of sadness, arousal, anger, 
 
 29. Forgiveness: Letting Go of Grudges and Bitterness, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/forgiveness/mh00131. 
 30. Loren Toussaint & Jon R. Webb, Theoretical and Empirical Connections Between 
Forgiveness, Mental Health, and Well-Being, in HANDBOOK OF FORGIVENESS, supra note 22, at 
349, 349. 
 31. Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet, Traumatic Intrusive Imagery as an Emotional Memory 
Phenomenon: A Review of Research and Explanatory Information Processing Theories, 17 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 509, 509 (1997). 
 32. See generally Roy F. Baumeister, Julie Juola Exline & Kristin L. Sommer, The Victim 
Role, Grudge Theory, and Two Dimensions of Forgiveness, in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH & THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 79 (Everett L. Worthington, Jr. 
ed., 1998). 
 33. Id. at 98. 
 34. Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet, Thomas E. Ludwig & Kelly L. Vander Laan, Granting 
Forgiveness or Harboring Grudges: Implications for Emotion, Physiology, and Health, 12 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 117, 118 (2001); see also Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Empirical Research in 
Forgiveness: Looking Backward, Looking Forward, in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS, supra 
note 32, at 321. 
 35. vanOyen Witvliet et al., supra note 34, at 117. 
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and lack of control.36 During unforgiving imagery, participants 
experienced increased heart rates and blood pressure, significantly 
greater sympathetic nervous system arousal, elevated brown muscle 
activity,37 and skin conductance, many of which persisted into the 
post-imagery recovery period.38 
On an interpersonal level, those who forgive exhibit greater 
empathy, understanding, tolerance, agreeableness, and insight 
resulting in prosocial transformations.39 Those that are less forgiving 
tend to be less compassionate and score higher in depression, 
neuroticism, negative affectivity, and vengeful motivations.40 As 
reported by spouses, one of the most important factors contributing to 
marital longevity and satisfaction is the capacity to offer and seek 
forgiveness.41 Children living in areas characterized by violence and 
poverty that are introduced to forgiveness in the classroom have 
shown significantly less anger.42 Families that report a history of 
forgiveness have better individual member mental health and higher 
levels of family functionality.43 These findings add to a growing body 
of knowledge and have led some psychologists to explore 
unforgiveness as a public health problem.44 
The United Nations has been heavily involved in the promotion 
of forgiveness and related research, hoping to refine its amnesty 
practices and establish peaceful civil and international relationships.45 
 
 36. Id. at 120. 
 37. Id. at 121 (measured by corrugator electromyograms). 
 38. Id. at 122. 
 39. Caryl E. Rusbult et al., Forgiveness and Relational Repair, in HANDBOOK OF 
FORGIVENESS, supra note 22, at 185, 194. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Frank D. Fincham, Julie H. Hall & Steven R. H. Beach, “‘Til Lack of Forgiveness 
Doth Us Part”: Forgiveness and Marriage, in HANDBOOK OF FORGIVENESS, supra note 22, at 
207, 207. 
 42. Robert Enright et al., Forgiveness Education with Children in Areas of Violence and 
Poverty, in FORGIVENESS: A SAMPLING OF RESEARCH RESULTS, supra note 28, at 11, 12. 
 43. Cynthia L. Battle & Ivan W. Miller, Families and Forgiveness, in HANDBOOK OF 
FORGIVENESS, supra note 22, at 227, 233-34. 
 44. Frank D. Fincham, Steven R. H. Beach & Joanne Davila, Forgiveness and Conflict 
Resolution in Marriage, in FORGIVENESS: A SAMPLING OF RESEARCH RESULTS, supra note 28, 
at 8, 9. 
 45. See, e.g., Eileen R. Borris, Forgiveness and the Healing of Nations, UNIVERSAL 
PEACE FED’N (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.upf.org/education/speeches/3464-eileen-r-borris-
forgiveness-and-the-healing-of-nations (Presentation at the Parallel Event of the 55th 
Commission on the Status of Women “Women and the World at a Turning Point,” Mission of 
Nigeria to the UN, New York, U.S.A.) (an example of the United Nations relationship with the 
Universal Peace Federation and their efforts and funding for fostering forgiveness). 
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Research demonstrates that “forgiveness programs can restore healthy 
emotions, thus potentially aiding social reconstruction and 
dialogue.”46 This is true of mothers who lost sons due to conflicts in 
Northern Ireland and underwent the Stanford Forgiveness Project’s 
six day forgiveness training. The mothers showed a fifty percent 
reduction in perceived stress, a forty percent reduction in depression, 
and a twenty-three percent reduction in anger, a significant reduction 
in hurt, and a significant increase in physical vitality.47 For groups, 
reminders of historical victimization, such as the horrendous events of 
the Holocaust, have been shown to result in legitimization of actions 
taken toward a new enemy, such as Palestinian terrorism, in the 
present.48 Forgiveness intervention in Rwanda—where violence 
between groups had stopped, attitudes between members of the 
groups had not changed, and future violence was likely to occur—
have promoted structural and institutional stability in the country’s 
justice system and educational system leading toward sustained 
mutual acceptance.49 
The benefits of forgiveness have been shown to “spill over” into 
situations and relationships outside of the original conflict, where 
those forgiven engage in more volunteerism, charity donations, and 
other altruistic behavior.50 The interconnected world may find itself 
full lacking the above benefits if we do not recognize the value of 
forgiveness in the digital age and take steps to preserve it. 
2. Those Who Are Forgiven 
In addition, wrongdoers benefit from being forgiven by others. 
Individuals value the good will of their fellow human beings, and 
many of those who have transgressed “feel the bite of conscience for 
their misdeeds.”51 “Forgiveness may lighten the burden of guilt from 
 
 46. Enright et al., supra note 42, at 11, 13. 
 47. Luskin, supra note 28, at 14, 15. 
 48. Michael J. A. Wohl & Nyla R. Branscombe, Forgiving the Ingroup or the Outgroup 
for Harm Doing, in FORGIVENESS: A SAMPLING OF RESEARCH RESULTS, supra note 28, at 23, 
24. 
 49. Ervin Staub & Laurie Anne Pearlman, Promoting Reconciliation and Forgiveness 
After Mass Violence: Rwanda and Other Settings, in FORGIVENESS: A SAMPLING OF RESEARCH 
RESULTS, supra note 28, at 31, 32-34. 
 50. Johan C. Karremans, Paul A. M. Van Lange & Rob W. Holland, Forgiveness and Its 
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Offender, 31 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BUL. 1315, 1315 (2005). 
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their shoulders, making it easier for them to move on with their 
lives.”52 Those who avoid denying their mistakes and “ask for and 
receive forgiveness are more likely to learn their lessons.”53 The 
desire to earn forgiveness can be a catalyst for healthy, positive 
change.54 Like the process of forgiving another, being forgiven aids 
psychological healing, improves physical and mental health, restores 
a victim’s sense of personal power, promotes reconciliation between 
the offended and offender, and promotes hope for the resolution of 
real-world intergroup conflict.55 Forgiving oneself is also beneficial. 
Lower self-esteem, greater depression, increased anxiety and anger 
are associated with difficulty forgiving the self.56 Self-forgivers report 
better relationships with their victims, as well as less regret, self-
blame, and guilt.57 
B. Forgetting and Forgiving 
While forgiveness may be good for us individually and socially, 
it is difficult to obtain any level of forgiveness when we cannot 
escape reminders of the violation. “The capacity to forget aspects of 
the past (or remember them in a different way) is deeply connected to 
the power to forgive others.”58 As one scholar notes, the “inability to 
modulate the emotional content of the memory of an affront severely 
diminishes the capacity to forgive it.”59 In fact, those that have been 
wronged are “less likely to forgive to the extent that they exhibit 
greater rumination and recall a greater number of prior transgressions, 
and are more likely to forgive to the extent that they develop more 
benign attributions regarding the causes of the perpetrator’s 
actions.”60 The ability to forgive oneself and to accept the forgiveness 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. “As twelve-step programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous emphasize, admitting 
guilt is an essential step along the road to reform.” Id. at 334-35. 
 54. Id. at 335. 
 55. Forgiveness—Definitions and Effects, in FORGIVENESS: A SAMPLING OF RESEARCH 
RESULTS, supra note 28, at 5, 5. 
 56. See Paul A. Mauger et al., The Measurement of Forgiveness: Preliminary Research, 
11 J. OF PSYCHOL. AND CHRISTIANITY 170 (1992). 
 57. Jeanne S. Zechmeister & Catherine Romero, Victim and Offender Accounts of 
Interpersonal Conflict: Autobiographical Narratives of Forgiveness and Unforgiveness, 82 J. OF 
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 675, 681 (2002). 
 58. O. Carter Snead, Memory and Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1233 (2011). 
 59. Id. at 1233-34; see AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY 205 (2002) (“[A]s 
long as the offended one retains any scars from the injury, the forgiveness is not complete.”). 
 60. Rusbult et al., supra note 39, at 185, 195. 
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of others depends, in part, on escaping memories of wrongs or 
indiscretions: “[T]he capacity to let go of the painful emotions 
associated with our memory of wronging others is integral to 
accepting their forgiveness for our faults.”61 Assuming information 
remains indefinitely accessible to a search engine, “forgiving” 
anyone, including oneself, may be incredibly problematic. 
The perpetual memory of the Internet hinders forgetting, thereby 
stifling forgiveness. “Online, the past remains fresh. The pixels do not 
fade with time as our memories do.”62 Since we live in a world where 
everything is saved—archived instead of deleted—”memories have a 
way of forcing themselves to the surface in the most unexpected 
ways.”63 Due to the Internet’s perfect memory, “we are no longer able 
to generalize and abstract, and so remain lost in the details of our 
past.”64 Searching the Internet “might unearth some powerful 
moments you [had not] expected, or [would not] have necessarily 
wanted,” to remember.65 Painful memories “can be paralyzing, like a 
digital [post-traumatic stress disorder], with flashbacks to events that 
you can’t control.”66 Without information controls, we face a digital 
future that is forever unforgiving because it is unforgetting.67 
Currently, the European Union is pushing to update its 1995 
Data Protection Directive68 to add a “Right to Be Forgotten.”69 The 
update would require Internet companies to get consent before storing 
personal data and to delete it on request,70 and possibly require search 
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 65. Hill, supra note 62. 
 66. Id. 
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 68. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
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Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31, available at http://eur-
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/1462. 
 70. Jason Walsh, When It Comes to Facebook, EU Defends the “Right to Disappear,” 
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to ignore tagged results.71 As it redrafts its Data Protection Directive, 
it must confront the laws of a number of member countries that allow 
citizens to force the removal of certain harmful, private content after a 
specified amount of time.72 A unique and controversial aspect of these 
rights is the user may request that information that was once truthful 
and newsworthy may be blocked from search results after a certain 
amount of time in an attempt to make the information private. As a 
result, two compelling camps have arisen: the Preservationists and the 
Deletionists.73 The Preservationists believe the Internet offers the 
most truthful and comprehensive history of humanity ever collected 
and feel a duty to descendants to create and protect raw digital 
legacies without censorship.74 The Deletionists argue that the Internet 
must learn to forget in order to preserve vital societal values, that 
human culture cannot handle total recall gracefully, and that threats to 
the dignity and privacy of individuals will create an open yet 
oppressive networked space.75 
Forgiveness can be dangerous; it has the ability to cause its own 
injustices, particularly when offered by a third-party, as opposed to 
the wronged, or when offered too quickly.76 A victim or offended 
observer may feel that the offender has not had to feel the 
proportional repercussions of his or her actions or that the act was 
simply unforgiveable.77 Philosophical writings on the subject promote 
forgiveness as a virtue,78 but are found alongside writing addressing 
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Lamb & Jeffrie G. Murphy eds., 2002). 
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the moral value of retribution and revenge.79 The most severe threat of 
disrupting the benefits to forgiveness is from offering or receiving it 
too quickly or too late.80 “[S]elf-respect, respect for the moral order, 
respect for the wrongdoer, and even respect for forgiveness itself” 
may be undermined by hasty forgiveness.81 
It is important to remember that making scarring information 
less accessible does not require a victim, or anyone else, to forgive the 
offender in the traditional sense. Instead, decreased accessibility 
removes the constant reminder of the scarring information from all 
parties’ online experiences, allowing for forgiveness to occur 
naturally. Significant negative consequences result from too much 
memory, “in which families and relationships are forever destroyed 
by disordered and persistent memories of grievances suffered.”82 The 
authors propose that forgetting and forgiving are important aspects of 
privacy law because they allow personal information to become less 
public, and incite fewer negative effects for those involved. The 
exercise of such a legal claim or right to oblivion, if crafted correctly, 
could help maximize the expressive potential of the Internet, while 
quelling anxiety related to an inhibited, exposed existence. Section IV 
describes possible legal options for manipulating information and the 
resulting balances. 
C. Privacy and Forgiveness 
Forgiveness is tied to privacy through forgetting. Information 
about us that inhibits our ability to be autonomous triggers privacy 
concerns. Information can limit what an individual may realistically 
pursue in life, limit her ability to change and grow, and limit her 
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perception of self; thus, information privacy is an important aspect of 
moral autonomy.83 A very direct limitation caused by personal 
information online exists in the job market. In 2011, 91% of recruiters 
reported incorporating social networking sites in their evaluation of 
job applicants.84  
Many have defined privacy as embodying concepts of 
forgiveness. According to Alan Westin, privacy is “the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others.”85 Professor of law Charles Fried defines privacy as “not 
simply an absence of information about us in the mind of others; 
rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves.”86 
Law professor Jerry Kang defines privacy as “an individual’s control 
over the processing—i.e., the acquisition, disclosure, and use—of 
personal information.”87 Without forgiveness, these definitions of 
privacy require people to make accurate predictions regarding the 
consequences of sharing information prior to disclosure.88 
Like privacy, forgiveness must be grounded in the “constellation 
of values to which most, if not all, societies are committed.”89 The 
functional relationships forgiveness has to well-being, creativity, 
individual and community development, autonomy, mental health, 
and liberty are similar to those it has to privacy, as expressed by law 
professor Ruth Gavison.90 Theoretically and empirically, forgiveness 
is tied to removing past mistakes, indiscretions, and negative 
associations to become happy, productive members of society. These 
notions promote individual and community development, mental 
health, well-being, and liberty. 
Autonomy, creativity, and liberty are promoted when an 
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individual is allowed to re-define himself, to change, to be something 
other than popular perceptions of him. In his book, Delete, professor 
and privacy expert Viktor Mayer-Schönberger explains that “digital 
memory” denies the possibility of individual evolution; our past 
transgressions, such as reckless behaviors characteristic of our 
teenage years, become conflated with the more commendable 
accomplishments of our adult life.91 If forgiveness is tied to change, 
digital memory impedes forgiveness because “there may be little 
incentive to actively work on escaping one’s caste and breaking out of 
one’s mold.”92 
While the European Union is contemplating a uniform Right to 
Be Forgotten, the United States has focused on consumer privacy and 
security.93 The authors believe it is time for all countries reflecting on 
what types of restraints and freedoms should be placed upon the 
Internet to consider which values must be preserved, how those 
values should be preserved, and what can be left behind. The United 
States—the so-called “land of opportunity”—is itself the product of 
second chances and has allowed individuals and groups to wrangle 
free from their past to prosper. Those that were negatively labeled in 
Europe came to America to start a new life and later Midwesterners 
and Easterners migrated and settled the West looking to start a new 
life. These notions are of course romanticized, but one has to wonder 
whether permitting digital labels that permanently attach to 
individuals will strip second chances from the U.S. national identity 
and create significant injustices and/or inequalities for certain users. 
Migrating private information that has been made public back 
into the control of its subject would have significant benefits. By 
placing private information back into what political philosopher 
Michael Walzer calls its appropriate “sphere of justice,” informational 
injustice like harsh inferences, unfair dismissal, or inaccurate 
representations can be avoided.94 Information rules should attempt to 
maintain information in the sphere where it belongs95 and, we argue, 
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allow information to be re-located to the sphere that is appropriate at a 
given time. This gives individuals and groups a chance to forgive and 
be forgiven without constant reminders of information related to the 
harm, an act even the Amish needed to undertake in order to forgive 
and move forward. 
Increasing aggregation and availability of information online 
means the past can be stirred with greater frequency, triggering 
memories that would have otherwise been forgotten. Philosophy 
professor Avishai Margalit argues persuasively that successful 
forgiveness requires the “overcoming of resentment” that attends the 
memory of the wrong done.96 As individuals will acutely re-
experience the humiliation or pain of their indiscretions, offenses or 
tragedies when memories of such come to mind, the Internet Age has 
decreased the chances of successful forgiveness.97 When Montgomery 
County, Texas district attorney Brett Lignon began Tweeting the 
names of drivers arrested for drunk driving, he stated, “There is an 
embarrassment factor, the scarlet letter of law enforcement.”98 A 
number of sites post arrest information, complete with photo, name, 
and arrest details.99 The posts are not updated100 as the charges 
progress. Moving beyond an arrest, no matter the innocence 
surrounding the incident, is more difficult in the Digital Age. The 
“scarlet letter of law enforcement” was not generally pinned to those 
simply arrested in an analog world. Judgments can turn inward in the 
context of cyberbullying. Fifteen year old Amanda Todd took her 
own life after posting a desperate YouTube video explaining the 
details of her bullying.101 In the video, the vulnerable girl explained 
that the scandalous image she had been convinced to create had led to 
brutal on and offline torment.102 She suffered from depression and 
anxiety; in the video, she holds a card that reads “I can never get that 
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Photo back.”103 Overly vivid memories keep resentment alive.104 The 
time is ripe to ask whether the Internet should be a forgiving place or 
a resentful one—whether technology is an impediment to the well-
being of society. 
II. TOWARD PRESERVING FORGIVENESS WITH CODE, NORMS, AND 
MARKETS 
Preserving a role for forgiveness in a networked future gains 
urgency with the increasing importance of digital reputations in the 
information economy. Publishing tools and search capabilities 
threaten to leave innocent victims without recourse, and inaccurate or 
outdated information is not as useful as accurate, up-to-date 
information. To avoid devolving toward a world where “you are 
[literally] who Google says you are,”105 digital identity must be 
manipulable to allow for people to change and grow. 
Of course, the appropriate time for legal intervention is hotly 
debated,106 and often other mechanisms offer more efficient solutions 
to social problems. Values, including forgiveness, are governed and 
preserved differently in the digital realm. Lawrence Lessig, the 
foremost authority on privacy and technology, explains that, much 
like in real space, code, norms, markets, and law operate together to 
govern values and behaviors online.107 This section analyzes how the 
confines of the computer code, the pressure of adhering to social 
norms, and the invisible hand of market-based solutions are assessed. 
The authors conclude that each are ineffective or incomplete means of 
preserving forgiveness. 
A. Code 
In Forgetting as a Feature, Not a Bug: The Duality of Memory 
and Implications for Ubiquitous Computing, professor of computer 
science and information systems Liam Bannon warned that “[t]he 
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tendency to use the power of the computer to store and archive 
everything can lead to stultification in thinking, where one is afraid to 
act due to the weight of the past.”108 Bannon insists: 
What is necessary is to radically re-think the relation between 
artefacts and our social world. The aim is to shift attention to a 
portion of the design space in human–computer interaction and 
ubiquitous computing research that has not been much explored—a 
space that is supportive of human well-being.109 
One of the more interesting solutions to privacy problems that 
are not easily or appropriately addressed by the law alone is the 
concept of privacy-by-design.110 Building the value of privacy into the 
design of a system offers a preventative measure, establishes 
standards, and potentially lightens the load on government oversight 
and enforcement. Forgiveness-by-design or automated forgiveness 
would be a code-based solution, but at this point, an inappropriate one 
for the purposes outlined in this article. 
Computer scientists have begun to play with coding forms of 
forgiveness, each outlining variables of forgiveness and re-
establishing trust. DigitalBlush is a project designed to support 
technology-mediated facilitation of forgiveness focusing on the 
importance of the human emotions of shame and embarrassment.111 
The researchers developed a formal computational model of 
forgiveness and designed a tool to support rule violation reports and 
link victim with offender to facilitate forgiveness.112 This required the 
researchers to categorize elements of human forgiveness. The first, 
violation appraisal, accounts for the severity, intent, and frequency of 
the exhibited behavior.113 The second, reversal, address the role of 
apologies and acts of restitution.114 Lastly, pre-existing factors like the 
familiarity with and level of commitment to the offender are 
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considered.115 Then the project collected user generated information 
on rule violations in specific communities.116 
Other researchers have focused on the role forgiveness plays 
among artificial intelligence agents by portraying the re-establishment 
of trust as an assessment of regret that can be cured or diminished 
overtime depending on the conduct of the offending agent.117 The 
model is particularly valuable because it accounts for the limits of 
forgiveness (conduct that is unforgivable) and the importance of 
time.118 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger suggests that users should be able 
to attach an expiration date to information, after which it would no 
longer be accessible.119 Applying an expiration date would only be 
available for information created by the subject and would require 
predicting a useful lifespan at the time of creation. 
The process of coding forgiveness of harmful online information 
carries the same issues as coding to remove unauthorized use of 
copyrighted material in such a way that also protects fair use: there 
are too many human elements. The delicate nature of human 
forgiveness and its implications for censorship require a non-
automated response until a system can be designed to know when an 
individual feels extreme shame or harm by information online and 
whether it can be appropriately removed or unindexed. If not done 
thoughtfully, manipulation of this content or the system that preserves 
it in the name of forgiveness may threaten the openness and 
robustness of the Internet. This conclusion is not to suggest that 
technology cannot be used to support norms of forgiveness or that 
code is not an integral part of any forgiveness preservation effort, but 
only that a singularly technological effort will not solve the problem 
of individual stagnation of one’s persona online. 
B. Norms and Markets 
Norms have been suggested as an answer to addressing digital 
memory and preserving moral dignity in cyberspace.120 Julian 
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Togelius, professor and artificial intelligence researcher in 
Copenhagen, argues that “we have to adapt our culture to the 
inevitable presence of modern technology. [ . . . ] We will simply 
have to assume that people can change and restrict ourselves to 
looking at their most recent behavior and opinions.”121 According to 
Danah Boyd, research fellow at the Harvard Berkman Center for 
Internet and Society, “People, particularly younger people, are going 
to come up with coping mechanisms. That’s going to be the shift, not 
any intervention by a governmental or technological body.”122 Jeffrey 
Rosen argues, “[T]he most practical solution to the problem of digital 
forgetting . . . is to create new norms of atonement and 
forgiveness.”123 Essentially these scholars argue that we will all begin 
to accept seeing previously closeted skeletons revealed digitally and 
become capable of ignoring them or judge them less harshly. 
Authors and commentators question the success of relying on 
social adaptation to preserve forgiveness in the age where it is 
impossible to forget. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger appreciates these 
ideas, but argues reliance on norms will take too long to avoid 
significant social damage or is simply an attempt at unattainable 
social changes.124 Philosophy professor Jeffrey Reiman rebuts 
challenges of social adaptation as they relate to privacy by explaining 
that “[e]ven if people should ideally be able to withstand social 
pressure in the form of stigmatization or ostracism, it remains unjust 
that they should suffer these painful fates simply for acting in 
unpopular or unconventional ways.”125 Ruth Gavison also refutes 
these arguments, noting that “the absence of privacy may mean total 
destruction of the lives of individuals condemned by norms with only 
 
omitted) (quoting and citing Hiroko Tabuchi, Facebook Wins Relatively Few Friends in Japan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at B1, who finds that in a “survey of 2,130 Japanese mobile Web 
users . . . , 89 percent of respondents said they were reluctant to disclose their real names on the 
Web”). 
 121. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 64, at 154 (alteration in original) (quoting Julian 
Togelius, SLASHDOT (May 10, 2007, 9:12 AM), 
http://yro.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=234167&cid=19065957). 
 122. Jessica Winter, The Advantages of Amnesia, BOSTON.COM (Sept. 23, 2007), 
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/09/23/the_advantages_of_amnesia/
?page=full (quoting Danah Boyd). 
 123. Rosen, supra note 5, at 354. 
 124. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 64, at 155. 
 125. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the 
Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 36 (1995). 
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questionable benefit to society.”126 
Those who are wronged “experience powerful, gut-level 
impulses toward vengeance,” impulses that must be tempered to make 
way for forgiveness.127 However, the human memory and its ability to 
forget may not be susceptible to alteration. The brain’s management 
of information is a result of evolution over long periods of time as it 
adapts to the context and environments in which it is processing.128 
This view is shared by many leading psychologists, including Harvard 
University professor David Schacter who agrees that memory and 
forgetting mechanisms are deeply embedded in brain functionality.129 
Bad events experienced by individuals have stronger impacts on 
memory, emotion, and behavior than good events.130 Negative 
impressions and stereotypes are “quicker to form and more resistant 
to disconfirmation” than positive ones.131 The brain reacts more 
strongly to stimuli it deems negative; a reaction termed “negativity 
bias.”132 This is bolstered by behavioral research. For example, Ph.D. 
candidate Laura Brandimarte at Carnegie Mellon University 
measured how people discount information with negative and positive 
valence.133 These experiments support the conclusion that bad 
information is discounted less and has longer lasting effects than good 
information.134 
Markets also have limitations for addressing a society that is 
incapable of forgetting. Certainly, reputation systems135 like those for 
sellers on eBay and Amazon allow for reputational cure by 
performing a large number of trust-affirming transactions, making the 
 
 126. Gavison, supra note 90, at 453. 
 127. Rusbult et al., supra note 39, at 187. 
 128. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 64, at 155. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad Is Stronger Than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 323, 
323 (2001). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Hara Estroff Marano, Our Brain’s Negative Bias, PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 20, 2003), 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200306/our-brains-negative-bias. 
 133. See Laura Brandimarte, Discounting the Past: Bad Weighs Heavier Than Good (H. 
John Heinz III Coll.–Sch. of Pub. Policy and Mgmt., Carnegie Mellon Univ., Second Research 
Paper, drft. 2010), available at http://heinz.cmu.edu/research/384full.pdf (addressing how 
information related to past events and retrieved today is discounted and evaluated by the reader). 
 134. Id. at Part VI, para. 1. 
 135. Reputation systems compute a reputation score for a set of objects based on opinions 
expressed by others on the object. Kristiina Karvonen et al., Visual Nudges for Enhancing the 
Use and Produce of Reputation Information, 612 CEUR WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 1, 1 (2010), 
available at http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-612/paper1.pdf. 
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poor review less representative of the seller’s commercial conduct. 
The equivalent solution for personal reputation is to try to get 
negative information pushed off the first few pages of search results 
by bombarding the Internet with positive content. Those suffering 
from negative online content can and do hire reputation management 
companies, presenting positive information about the client as 
opposed to presenting the confidences and character testimony of 
others.136 These services game the system and are only available to 
those that can afford them, targeting doctors, lawyers, and companies 
that have received negative comments online. Relying on the market, 
however, runs the risk of endangering consumers because it allows 
for those subjects whose information is the socially vital (i.e., 
politicians and professional service providers) to be hidden.137 By 
allowing the market to effectively suppress speech to the last few 
pages of a search result, censorship is administered without any 
oversight or safeguards. This type of manipulation may also further 
victimize those that have been harmed by making them feel as though 
the subject suffered no social ramifications because he or she could 
pay to avoid them. Finally, the market ignores privacy as a right, only 
providing forgetting services to those that can afford it and those 
comfortable with a large online presence. 
The above mechanisms are simply ill-equipped to handle 
forgiveness if the Internet Age continues its pervasive unforgetting. 
As we outsource our memories to computers, our lives are captured in 
incredibly minute and major ways.138 This experience can lead to a 
variety of tangible, dignitary harms.139 As expressed above, allowing 
privacy rights to be determined by preference exposes them to 
extinction and inappropriately characterizes their role in society. 
III. FORGIVENESS AND THE LAW 
As established in Part I, forgiveness plays an important role in 
the development of individual autonomy, and as a social value should 
not be discarded lightly. Basic American values and ideas of fairness 
 
 136. See, e.g., A Bad Online Reputation Could Cost You the Election, REPUTATION.COM, 
http://www.reputation.com/reputationwatch/articles/a-bad-online-reputation-could-cost-you-the-
election (last visited Sep. 19, 2012) 
 137. See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE 
US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998). 
 138. Hill, supra note 62. 
 139. Rosen, supra note 5, at 345. 
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stemming from pioneer histories, including allowing individuals to 
start afresh or wipe the slate clean, are in stark contrast with existing 
data production, collection, retention, and retrieval practices.140 The 
authors encourage an approach to privacy that recognizes the value of 
forgiveness to individuals and to society as a whole.141 
The protection of one’s personal information privacy is a 
fundamental right in the European Union.142 Without such a label in 
the United States, information privacy has been regulated in a 
piecemeal fashion by states, agencies, courts, and lawmakers. As law 
professor Samantha Barbas notes, “At any given time, a society calls 
on privacy law to do certain kinds of work—to validate particular 
social structures, practices, and ethics.”143 We propose to call on 
privacy law to validate the important role forgetting plays in the value 
of forgiveness, and to do so in a manner that respects and references 
existing legal regimes in this country. 
Research establishes that forgiveness promotes important aspects 
of individual and social well-being and independence.144 The authors 
define forgiveness broadly—encompassing notions of allowing the 
wrongdoer and victim to move on, providing a clean slate, promoting 
closure, and fostering a productive reintroduction to society. While 
not featured prominently in the U.S. legal system, forgiveness and 
forgetting are important elements of our cultural identity, and appear 
to varying degrees in different contexts.145 The laws demonstrate that 
the U.S. is prepared to offer remedies of forgiving and forgetting 
when the benefits to individuals and to society outweigh the likely 
harms.146 A survey of these laws, and the individual and social 
 
 140. See Jean-Francois Blanchette & Deborah G. Johnson, Data Retention and the 
Panoptic Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness, 18 INFO. SOC’Y 33, 35 (2002). 
The idea of “starting over” or moving to a new frontier is a powerful concept in 
American culture. The beliefs that once a debt has been paid to society it is 
forgotten and that people can change are important American traditions. 
Americans pride themselves on looking at what a person is today rather than 
what he may have been in the past. 
Id. (quoting GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 223 (1988)). 
 141. Id. at 36. 
 142. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. 
 143. Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical Perspective, 
22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 173 (2010). 
 144. See generally HANDBOOK OF FORGIVENESS, supra note 22. 
 145. Blanchette & Johnson, supra note 140, at 35-40. 
 146. Id. 
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benefits they seek to foster, informs and supports the exercise of 
imagining how forgiveness would most appropriately be incorporated 
into U.S. privacy law. This section begins with a survey of the U.S. 
legal approach to forgiveness and an analysis of the rare 
circumstances under which individual and social benefits have 
compelled us to legally forgive and forget in two key contexts: (a) 
restoration (financial, criminal, and immunity from suit); and (b) 
protection from the disclosure of information. We then employ 
thematic network analysis to extract overlapping themes to inform the 
development of a U.S. approach to oblivion. 
A. Restoration 
Restoration involves recognition of the social value of 
forgiveness and the ways in which the legal system can encourage 
forgetting.147 It is a form of rebirth—a process that allows individuals 
to begin anew, unshackled by stigma and other impediments to being 
productive members of society.148 In the United States, restoration is 
not taken lightly, and occurs as much for the benefit of society as a 
whole as it does for the individual.149 This section explores the 
application of both financial and criminal restoration in U.S. law. 
These laws embody the value of forgiveness and provide for 
restoration in a variety of ways, permitting individuals to lessen the 
permanence of certain scarlet letters they may bear. “The restoration 
process may be gradual, just as the dialogue that leads to apology and 
forgiveness may gradually build mutual trust and understanding.”150 
Our document selection process included any legal mechanism that 
promotes moving on from past events or interactions toward a more 
productive lifestyle. The following describe themes extracted from 
the U.S. forgiveness laws. 
1. Financial Restoration 
American essayist, lecturer, and poet Ralph Waldo Emerson 
wrote, “A man in debt is so far a slave . . . .”151 In America, law offers 
financial forgiveness through bankruptcy—which is considered a 
“privilege offered to [those] who genuinely need the opportunity to 
 
 147. Bibas, supra note 51, at 341-42. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 342. 
 151. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, THE CONDUCT OF LIFE 90 (rev. ed., Riverside Press 1892). 
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start over.”152 A central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to allow 
for rebirth, “to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors 
can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy ‘a 
new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unhampered 
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.’”153 
However, while the history of bankruptcy law reveals a concern 
for the debtor, it is also clear that the law developed for the benefit of 
the creditor (and society) as well. 
The literature on the history of bankruptcy law . . . [describes] the 
tension between individual and social interests which was finally 
(and perhaps, only) resolved when there was a coming together of 
institutional interests (creditors’ interest in a noncompetitive way 
to obtain whatever they could), individual interests in being able to 
start afresh (having their mistakes forgiven and forgotten), and 
social interests (in responding to major economic crises and 
getting entrepreneurs back into the economy).154 
Bankruptcy law offers debtors a fresh start through the forgiveness of 
debts, as well as means of combating stigma. 
a. Forgiving Debt 
The value of forgiveness is embodied in the Bankruptcy Code’s 
discharge provisions, which “were designed to assist a financially 
distressed debtor to receive a fresh start in life unencumbered from 
the financial vicissitudes of the debtor’s past,”155 and relieved of most 
pre-petition liabilities.156 Generally, courts are required to grant a 
debtor a discharge of debts unless an exception applies.157 After a 
debtor receives a discharge, a creditor cannot seek to recover a 
discharged debt from the debtor158 and the discharge operates to 
permanently stay any attempt to hold the debtor personally liable for 
 
 152. E.g., United States v. Thomas, 342 B.R. 758, 762 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 153. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 
U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). 
 154. Blanchette & Johnson, supra note 140, at 36-37 (emphasis added). 
 155. In re Vina, 283 B.R. 803, 807 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002); see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. 
Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2006). 
 156. In re Strada Design Assocs., Inc., 326 B.R. 229, 240 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); see In 
re Detrano, 326 F.3d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 157. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2011). This is called “the heart of the fresh start provisions of the 
bankruptcy law.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 384 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6340, 1977 WL 9628. 
 158. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2011); e.g., DuBois v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 276 F.3d 1019, 
1022 (8th Cir. 2002). 
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the discharged debts.159 
Federally insured student loan debt is subject to unique discharge 
treatment under the Code. Bankruptcy courts may discharge student 
loan debt if they find it is an “undue hardship” on the debtor or the 
debtor’s dependents to require payment.160 Courts have exercised 
wide discretion in determining when repayment of the loan will 
impose an undue hardship. Most circuits that have addressed the issue 
of undue hardship have followed the test set forth in Brunner v. New 
York State Higher Education Services.161 Under the Brunner test, the 
debtor must show 
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and 
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her 
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional 
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to 
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the 
student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to 
repay the loans.162 
The Brunner test emphasizes the persistence of the disability, 
difficulty, or hardship. By requiring a showing of undue hardship, the 
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws “envisioned a determination of 
whether the amount and reliability of income and other wealth which 
the debtor could reasonably be expected to receive in the future could 
maintain the debtor and his or her dependents at a minimal standard 
of living as well as pay off the student loans.”163 When debtors cannot 
reasonably be expected to make student loan payments without falling 
below a minimum standard of living, the demand constitutes an 
“undue hardship.”164 Some courts go beyond the financial impact of 
student loan debt—considering nonpecuniary effects when 
determining whether undue hardship will be incurred.165 For example, 
 
 159. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2); e.g., In re Rosenfeld, 23 F.3d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 160. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2011); e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 
S.Ct. 1367, 1371 (2010). 
 161. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam). 
 162. Id. at 396. 
 163. In re Nys, 446 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 754 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. E.g., In re Reynolds, 425 F.3d 526, 533–34 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[E]xcepting the student 
loans from the discharge would cause an undue hardship to [debtor] because of the effect of the 
debts on [debtor’s] mental health.”). 
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hardship discharge has been permitted, in part, based on the 
psychological toll of unpaid student loan debt,166 the strain such debt 
can have on a debtor’s marriage,167 and threat such debt potentially 
poses to a debtor’s sobriety and mental stability.168 
The “fresh start” principle underlying bankruptcy law and policy 
“captures the notion that substantive relief should be afforded in the 
form of forgiveness of existing debt, with relinquishment by the 
debtor of either existing nonexempt assets or a portion of future 
income, in order to restore the debtor to economic productivity.”169 
The willingness to forgive certain debts, as evidenced by the law of 
student loan debt discharge, is determined by considering the burdens 
imposed if forgiveness is withheld. 
b. Combating Stigma 
As noted previously, one of the main goals of U.S. bankruptcy 
law is to permit honest debtors to start fresh, freed from the burdens 
resulting from economic misfortune.170 One of the most serious 
obstacles threatening the desired “fresh start” is not the debtor’s legal 
obligations to creditors, which can easily be canceled by the operation 
of the bankruptcy law, but rather the social stigma which commonly 
attaches to those who have sought the protections of bankruptcy.171 
Many people and institutions, regarding a debtor in bankruptcy as 
demonstrably improvident or perhaps even deceitful, may refuse to 
deal with the debtor in any regard, denying the debtor not only credit, 
but also essential services or the chance to earn a living.172 
To address these concerns, the Bankruptcy Code limits the effect 
 
 166. E.g., In re Larson, 426 B.R. 782, 794 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 167. E.g., In re Walker, 406 B.R. 840, 865-66 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009), aff’d, 427 B.R. 471 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 650 F.3d 1227 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 168. In re Brooks, 406 B.R. 382, 391-92 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009). 
 169. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 414 
(2005). 
 170. E.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 287, 286 (1991). 
 171. See, e.g., Derek S. Witte, The Bear Hug That Is Crushing Debt-Burdened Americans: 
Why Overzealous Regulation of the Debt-Settlement Industry Ultimately Harms the Consumers 
It Means to Protect, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 282-83 (2010) (“[M]any individuals who 
likely could qualify for post-reform individual bankruptcy still refuse to do so because of the 
social stigma attached to bankruptcy.”). 
 172. See generally John E. Theuman, Annotation, Protection of Debtor from Acts of 
Discrimination by Private Entity Under § 525(b) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.A. § 
525(b)), 105 A.L.R. FED. 555 (1991). 
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this information can have on the individual’s life. It bars the 
government from revoking or suspending a permit or license solely 
because the licensee is a Chapter 11 debtor, is insolvent, or has not 
paid a debt dischargeable under the Code.173 Additionally, it prohibits 
the government from denying employment to, terminating the 
employment of, or discriminating with respect to employment against 
a person who has declared bankruptcy.174 Although the Code does not 
prevent private employers from refusing to hire an individual based 
on his or her status as a bankruptcy debtor,175 it does prohibit private 
employers firing based on that status.176 Additionally, the Code 
prohibits private employers from engaging in discriminating 
employment practices based on one’s status as a bankruptcy debtor, 
such as in promotions, demotions, hours, pay, and so forth.177 
The purpose of the antidiscrimination provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code is to protect a debtor’s means of earning a living or 
pursuing a livelihood.178 These provisions help achieve one of the 
underlying purposes of the Code bestowing upon debtors “a new 
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by 
the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.”179 
2. Criminal Restoration 
The stigma of bankruptcy can pale in comparison to that of a 
criminal conviction. Individuals who violate the law and are judged 
offenders are punished in part through the loss of certain basic civil 
rights and social standing. Apart from impairment of self-esteem and 
informal social stigma, a criminal conviction negatively affects an 
individual’s legal status.180 For example, ex-offenders may be 
 
 173. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2011); e.g., In re Prof’l Sales Corp., 56 B.R. 753, 760 n.4 (N.D. 
Ill. 1985). 
 174. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a). 
 175. See, e.g., Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2011); In 
re Burnett, 635 F.3d 169, 172-73 (5th Cir. 2011); Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 
940-41 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 176. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (2011). 
 177. Id.; Myers, 640 F.3d at 1285-86. 
 178. E.g., In re Elsinore Shore Assocs., 66 B.R. 708, 720 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986). 
 179. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 
U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). 
 180. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, Prefatory Note, at 1-2 
(amended 2010) [hereinafter UCCCA], available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_10.pdf. 
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ineligible to vote181 or hold public office,182 and federal law bars many 
persons with certain convictions from possessing firearms,183 serving 
in the military,184 and on both civil and criminal juries.185 
“The point of punishment is not to ostracize criminals into a 
permanent underclass, . . . [but to] exact appropriate retribution and 
prepare offenders to return to the fold.”186 Forgiving and reintegrating 
offenders is valuable both symbolically and practically—it 
incentivizes reform, highlights a law-abiding way of life, and reflects 
“the humaneness of a society that, having denounced and punished, 
can rejoice over the return of its prodigal sons.”187 The following 
sections explore several ways criminal law in the United States 
incorporates forgiveness and why it does so. 
a. Restoration of Rights 
For the first 150 years of the existence of the United States, the 
rights and reputations of criminal offenders were restored through the 
grant of executive pardons.188 A pardon has been defined as a 
declaration on record that a person is thereafter relieved from the legal 
consequences of a specific crime.189 It is also commonly referred to as 
“an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the 
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is 
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he [or she] 
has committed.”190 
A pardon serves as forgiveness, release, remission; 
 
 181. Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/felon-voting-rights.aspx (last updated Mar. 
21, 2010); see, e.g., KY. CONST. § 145(1) (ex-felons permanently lose their right to vote absent 
pardon from the governor). 
 182. See, e.g., State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377 (N.D. 1934). 
 183. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2011). 
 184. 10 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2011). 
 185. See generally Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. 
REV. 65 (2003). 
 186. Bibas, supra note 51, at 342. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and 
the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 764 (2011). 
 189. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (a pardon, when granted, is “the 
determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting 
less than what the judgment fixed”); Whittington v. Stevens, 73 So. 2d 137, 139 (Miss. 1954); 
State ex rel. Coole v. Sims, 58 S.E. 2d 784, 789-90 (W. Va. 1950). 
 190. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833); Pa. Prison Soc’y. v. Cortes, 622 
F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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“[f]orgiveness for an offense, whether it be one for which the person 
committing it is liable in law or otherwise.”191 The Constitution 
confers the power to grant pardons and reprieves on the President,192 
and in most states similar power is vested in the executive branch.193 
The power to pardon, except as limited by the constitutions, extends 
to every offense against the government known to the law,194 but is 
limited to offenses against the state as such.195 
According to the Supreme Court, a pardon “releases the offender 
from all disabilities imposed by the offence, and restores to him all 
his civil rights. In contemplation of law, it so far blots out the offence, 
that afterwards it cannot be imputed to him to prevent the assertion of 
his legal rights.”196 Generally, a full pardon absolves one from all 
legal consequences of his or her crime.197 When granted after 
conviction for a crime, it removes the penalties and disabilities which 
ordinarily follow from conviction.198 For the vast majority of adult 
criminal offenders, a pardon offers the only way of completely 
avoiding or mitigating the collateral consequences of conviction.199 
Pardons have a broad restorative effect; they both relieve legal 
disabilities and signal rehabilitation of an offender.200 A pardon gives 
an offender “a new credit and capacity, and rehabilitates him to that 
extent in his former position.”201 It is “the ‘gold standard’ for 
confirming good character, so that an employer, landlord, or lending 
 
 191. Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 309 (1855); United States v. Garwood, 20 M.J. 148, 153 
(C.M.A. 1985). 
 192. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (conferring upon the President the power to grant 
pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment). 
 193. See, e.g., Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 253 (Fla. 2001); State v. Rafuse, 726 A.2d 
18, 19 (Vt. 1998); State v. Horn, 594 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Wis. 1999). 
 194. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896); Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 
1248, 1255 n.8 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 195. Arnett v. Stumbo, 153 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Ky. 1941); Allen v. McGuire, 57 So. 217, 
217 (Miss. 1912). 
 196. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877). 
 197. Pa. Prison Soc’y. v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 28 A.2d 897, 899-900 (Pa. 1942)); In re Fredericks, 315 
P.2d 1010, 1013 (Or. 1957) (en banc). 
 198. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92, 103 (1890); Harbert v. Deukmejian, 173 
Cal. Rptr. 89, 91 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 199. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 39-61 (2006). 
 200. Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten 
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1720 (2003). 
 201. Knote, 95 U.S. at 153. 
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institution will have some level of comfort in dealing with an 
individual who has been deemed worthy of this high-level official 
forgiveness.”202 
In addition to an executive pardon, state statutes provide for 
automatic restoration of various civil rights upon completion of a 
criminal sentence.203 Our society also grants an ex-offender 
restoration of his or her rights through administrative procedures.204 
Georgia’s Board of Pardons and Paroles may issue a certificate to an 
ex-convict if she meets the standard of five years of law-abiding 
conduct.205 The certificate restores her basic civil rights as well as lifts 
licensing restrictions imposed by state law.206 Other states have 
similar administrative procedures in place. Such schemes often certify 
the bearer’s successful avoidance of criminal activity.207 The impetus 
for these laws is society’s view is that once an ex-convict’s debt to 
society is paid, he or she deserves to rejoin society and enjoy the same 
basic rights as other law-abiding citizens.208 
b. Addressing Collateral Consequences 
Pardons and laws of automatic restoration have been criticized as 
having limited value. Automatic restoration does not provide 
confirmation of good character in a way that overcomes societal 
prejudice against criminal offenders, which may linger long after the 
penalties prescribed by law have been fully satisfied.209 Pardons have 
been considered an “inherently unreliable remedy, especially for 
those with limited means and few connections.”210 
 
 202. Love, supra note 188, at 775-76. 
 203. Some jurisdictions essentially permit automatic restoration of all rights upon the 
completion of an ex-felon’s sentence. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28(2) (“Full rights are 
restored by termination of state supervision for any offense against the state.”). Others have 
rights-specific rules of automatic restoration. For example, offenders automatically regain the 
right to vote upon discharge from a felony sentence in only twenty-four states. Love, supra note 
200, at 1718 n.56. 
 204. Love, supra note 200, at 1720. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Love, supra note 188, at 778. 
 208. See, e.g., Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, 71st Sess. 
(Nv. 2001) (statement of Assemblywoman Giunchigliani), available at 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/71st/Minutes/Assembly/JUD/Final/650.html; see also N.Y. 
UNCONSOL. LAW § 1.05(6) (McKinney 2012) (requiring judges presiding at criminal sentencing 
to consider what sentence will best help promote the defendant’s rehabilitation). 
 209. See Love, supra note 200, at 1708. 
 210. Id. at 1708-09. 
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In the 1950s utilitarian law reformers set out to build a legal 
framework to limit collateral legal penalties. They sought to ease 
efforts to re-establish the names of those convicted of crimes in their 
communities.211 They believed that “[a] theory of law which 
withholds the finality of forgiveness after punishment is ended is as 
indefensible in logic as it is on moral grounds.”212 The restoration of 
rights would have limited, unacceptable impact unless the “subtle 
punishment represented by societal prejudice” is also addressed.213 
However, beginning in 1984 and persisting for at least twenty 
years, “the official position of the federal government was that 
criminals were to be labeled and segregated for the protection of 
society, not reclaimed and forgiven.”214 In 2003, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) “took the first step since the 1970s to address 
collateral consequences in a coherent and comprehensive fashion.”215 
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Collateral Sanctions and 
Discretionary Disqualification216 conceive of collateral consequences 
as closer to criminal punishment than to civil regulation. In 2009, the 
Uniform Law Commission (ULC)217 approved the Uniform Collateral 
Consequences of Convictions Act (UCCCA), which put the ABA 
Criminal Justice Standards on Collateral Sanctions and 
Discretionary Disqualification into language for state legislatures to 
utilize and establish a degree of national uniformity.218 
The UCCCA defines “collateral consequences” as including both 
“collateral sanctions” and “disqualifications.”219 A collateral sanction 
is a “penalty, disability, or disadvantage” imposed by operation of law 
as a result of an individual’s status as a convicted individual.220 A 
 
 211. Id. at 1707. 
 212. Id. at 1705 n.1 (quoting AARON NUSSBAUM, FIRST OFFENDERS, A SECOND CHANCE 
24 (1956)). 
 213. Id. at 1707-08. 
 214. Love, supra note 188, at 770. 
 215. Id. at 780. 
 216. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (2004). 
 217. The Uniform Law Commission was originally created to determine areas of state law 
in which uniformity is desirable and draft uniform and model acts for consideration by the 
states. See About the ULC, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Oct. 6, 
2012). 
 218. Love, supra note 188, at 783-84. 
 219. UCCCA § 2(1). 
 220. Id. § 2(2). 
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disqualification is “a penalty, disability, or disadvantage . . . that an 
administrative agency, governmental official, or court in a civil 
proceeding is authorized, but not required, to impose on an individual 
on grounds relating to the individual’s conviction of an offense.”221 
The basic approach to relief under the UCCCA first eliminates legal 
barriers (“collateral sanctions”) and then guides discretion. 
The relief provisions of the UCCCA provide immediate relief 
from specific status-generated legal barriers that might impede a 
convicted person’s ability to live in the community, and more 
complete relief from all such barriers after a period of law-abiding 
conduct.222 Importantly, the UCCCA also establishes parameters to 
guide a discretionary decision to disqualify where a collateral 
sanction either does not apply or has been relieved.223 
Section 10 of the UCCCA allows an individual to obtain relief as 
early as sentencing from a specific collateral sanction, if he can show 
that relief would “materially assist” in obtaining employment, 
education, housing, public benefits or occupational licensing, and that 
he has “substantial need” for the benefit to live a law-abiding life.224 
Application for an “order of limited relief” may be made to the 
sentencing court as part of the guilty plea process or after a jury’s 
guilty verdict, until the close of the proceeding at which sentencing is 
imposed.225 
Relief from all collateral sanctions would be available to an 
individual after a period of law-abiding conduct under Section 11 of 
the UCCCA, with five years being the suggested term.226 This more 
comprehensive relief, called a “certificate of restoration of rights,” 
may only be obtained from a designated board or agency, which is 
required to find that the individual is lawfully employed or otherwise 
has a lawful source of income, has been involved in no subsequent 
criminal conduct, and poses no danger to the public.227 
No offense or offender is disqualified from seeking relief under 
either Section 10 or Section 11. Issuance of an order under Section 10 
or a certificate under Section 11 converts an automatic collateral 
 
 221. Id. § 2(5). 
 222. Id. §§ 10-11; see also id. Prefatory Note, at 5-6. 
 223. Id. § 10; see also id. Prefatory Note, at 5. 
 224. Id. § 10(b) & cmt. at 29. 
 225. Id. § 10 & cmt. at 28. 
 226. Id. § 11(a). 
 227. Id. § 11 & cmt. at 31. 
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sanction into a discretionary “disqualification.”228 At that point, the 
discretionary provisions kick in to guide any case-specific decision to 
grant or deny a benefit or opportunity on grounds relating to an 
individual’s conviction. The discretionary provisions requires an 
“individualized assessment” before a decision-maker229 may deny a 
benefit or opportunity, and the “particular facts and circumstances 
involved in the offense, and the essential elements of the offense” 
may be considered only if they are “substantially related to the benefit 
or opportunity at issue.”230 
Uniformity of the collateral consequences contained in state 
statutes and administrative regulations is desirable and would be 
furthered by adoption of the UCCCA or a similar act. While model or 
uniform legislation such as the UCCCA does not carry the force of 
law, its incorporation of forgiveness is noteworthy; uniform acts 
approved by the ULC have been, and continue to be, tremendously 
important in shaping the development of law across the country.231 
3. Immunity from Suit 
If a criminal is able to avoid legal punishment for a long period 
of time, enforcement of an old claim can both halt rehabilitation and 
do a disservice to the community.232 For those who view the purpose 
of the criminal justice system as rehabilitating wrongdoers, 
forgiveness can become easier after the passage of time, or after self-
reform. Cornelius Pytsch, a California coal miner who had been 
orphaned at five, escaped from jail (where he was serving a sentence 
for statutory rape).233 He started over in Northlake, Illinois as Frank 
Raboski and became a diesel mechanic, president of the Northlake 
 
 228. Id. § 10 & cmt. at 28. 
 229. Id. § 8. The definition of “decision-maker” limits the application of the discretionary 
provisions to opportunities and benefits controlled by state actors, potentially including 
government contractors. See id. § 2(4). However, Sections 10 and 11 are not so limited by their 
terms, so that any collateral sanction that applied to a private entity (such as a nursing home or 
school) could be relieved under either of these sections. Id. § 10 & cmt. at 28-29. 
 230. Id. § 8. 
 231. One state (North Carolina) has adopted the UCCCA, and five states are currently 
considering adoption (Minnesota, New York, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); see 
Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Collateral%20Consequences%20of%20Conviction
%20Act (last visited Sep. 19, 2012). 
 232. Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to 
Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 634 (1954) [hereinafter Limitations in Criminal Law]. 
 233. Crime: The Good Citizen, TIME, May 11, 1953, at 24. 
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Home Owners Association, and treasurer of the Northlake Crime 
Commission (which he co-founded to “halt an invasion of Chicago 
hoodlums”). Almost twenty years later, in 1953, his true identity was 
discovered. California was ready to demand his return to complete his 
sentence. His neighbors in Northlake, including the Chief of Police, 
pledged their homes to raise Raboski’s $15,000 bail. They rallied 
behind him, appearing before the governor on his behalf.234 The 
Governor of Illinois was persuaded, and personally called Raboski to 
say that he would not be extradited.235 As in Raboski’s case, the 
pursuit of dormant claims can run contrary to notions of justice. 
Statutes of limitations, barring suits after the passage of time, 
were established long ago by Roman law.236 Limitations on personal 
actions were incorporated in the common law with the Limitation Act 
of 1623.237 By 1652, Massachusetts law included a general limitation 
period of one year on the prosecution of misdemeanors.238 Similar 
statutes had been adopted throughout the federal system by the end of 
the eighteenth century.239 
Today, statutes of limitations bar both civil and criminal claims 
in the U.S. In the criminal context, periods of limitation vary from 
state to state, and depend on the severity of the crime.240 Typically 
felonies have longer periods than misdemeanors, and murder and 
manslaughter are exempted entirely.241 As in the criminal system, the 
precise limitation period varies in the civil context as well. For 
example, the periods of limitations for personal injury actions are 
usually two or three years, but can be as long as six years.242 
Courts interpret statutes of limitations liberally.243 They typically 
 
 234. A Fugitive’s Friends Finally Win His Freedom, LIFE, June 22, 1953, at 47. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1177 
(1950) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. 
 237. Id. at 1178. 
 238. THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 163 (Rockwell & Churchill 1995) (1889). 
 239. Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 232, at 631-32. 
 240. DANIEL W. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE 
PROSECUTION OF OLD CRIMES: BALANCING LEGAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND MORAL CONCERNS 
56 (2000). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 63. 
 243. See Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 538 (1947) (holding that a two-year rather 
than four-year period governs income tax refund claims); United States v. Or. Lumber Co., 260 
U.S. 290 (1922) (six-year statute of limitations held to apply against the federal government in 
suit brought six years after government discovered the injury); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 
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run from the point when an injury is inflicted, but their application is 
subject to several exceptions, within the broad discretion of the 
legislature.244 In some cases, they do not begin to run until the point 
when the offense could “reasonably have been detected.”245 In other 
cases, concealment can result in the tolling of a statute.246 For 
example, if a perpetrator takes active steps to conceal his identity, 
changes residences, or otherwise attempts to escape detection or 
apprehension, the statute will not run during that period. Similarly, a 
statute can be tolled during continuing crimes, such as conspiracy.247 
With scant legislative history, it is difficult to discern the original 
motivations for adopting statutes of limitations.248 However, courts 
have been willing to enforce them even in cases of hardship.249 In so 
doing, courts describe them as serving a range of purposes. Statutes of 
limitations encourage the state to punish recent crimes.250 In the 
criminal context, they are viewed as a means of protecting the 
accused from the burden of defending against stale charges of 
misconduct from long ago.251 They are “founded upon the liberal 
theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in 
the files of the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs 
necessary to the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time 
passed beyond availability.”252 Further, they seek to encourage the 
 
(1879) (statute of limitations commenced running when fraud perpetrated, not when plaintiff 
learned of it); Johns v. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. 
Tex. 1993) (“Statutes of limitations, being procedural and remedial in nature, are generally 
accorded retroactive effect, unless they are unconstitutionally cast.”) (quoting Fust v. Arnar-
Stone Laboratories, 736 F.2d 1098, 1100 (5th Cir. 1984)); Hazelgrove v. Ford Motor Co., 428 F. 
Supp. 1096, 1098 (E.D. Va. 1977) (stating that “our Court of Appeals has exhibited a consistent 
tendency to construe the time limitations contained in Title VII in such a way as to effectuate the 
statute’s broad remedial purposes”); Lynch v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp. 946, 949 
(N.D. Tex. 1951) (“The policy that limitation statutes should be relaxed to avoid undue 
harshness where this can be done consistently with the true reason of such statutes has now been 
confirmed by legislative act . . . .”). 
 244. See, e.g., Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 633 (1877); see generally Farmers Coop. 
Co. v. Swift Pork Co., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
 245. SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 240, at 59. 
 246. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946). 
 247. SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 240, at 59. 
 248. Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 232, at 632. 
 249. See, e.g., Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1947); Kaltreider Constr., Inc. v. 
United States, 303 F.2d 366, 368-69 (3rd Cir. 1962); Burd v. McCullough, 217 F.2d 159, 162 
(7th Cir. 1954). 
 250. United States v. Eliopoulos, 45 F. Supp. 777, 780-81 (D.N.J. 1942). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 781. 
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introduction of fresher and therefore trustworthier evidence in 
criminal prosecution, rather than “evidence with a probative value 
which has grown weaker as man’s ability to remember has become 
impaired.”253 There are also strong reasons for requiring that civil 
suits be brought in a timely manner. In this context, statutes of 
limitations fulfill policies of fairness, repose and certainty.254 
Fairness and forgiveness are inherent in the context of statutes of 
limitations, which are viewed as acts of grace.255 Such statutes reflect 
the idea that those who have not repeated errors, but rather have self-
rehabilitated, should be free from “vexatious fear of prosecution for 
old crimes.”256 “It is easy to imagine how a revolutionary society 
eager to overthrow a discredited political system might be attracted by 
the notion of the fresh start implicit in the concept of limitation.”257 
Offenders who have begun a process of rehabilitation, seem to 
pose less of a threat to society. For them, statutes of limitations can 
serve as forgiveness and restoration in the form of an assurance that 
they will not be called into court to account for past offenses, and an 
incentive for further rehabilitation.258 
B. Protection from the Disclosure of Information 
Legal forgiveness can be demonstrated through limitations on 
access to information. It is now surprisingly easy to delve 
anonymously into other people’s past—the Internet makes available 
to all arms of government and the general public aggregate public 
record information about millions of Americans.259 “After the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, an entirely new industry devoted to background 
screening sprang up almost overnight”—an industry that remains 
essentially unregulated.260 Disseminating criminal and other public 
records has become a lucrative business—”information brokers and 
data-mining agencies [have] instant access to thousands of pieces of 
 
 253. Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 232, at 632. 
 254. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 (1974). 
 255. Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 232, at 630. 
 256. Id. at 634. 
 257. SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 240, at 56. 
 258. Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 232, at 634. 
 259. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 187669, 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
INFORMATION 58 (2001). 
 260. Love, supra note 188, at 772-73. 
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criminal record information each day.”261 There are hundreds of 
private companies that hold what was once only held by the state and 
provide it to those with the incentive to inquire.262 
The incentive to inquire is growing and the dissemination of 
information—criminal record263 information in particular—is proving 
to be quite lucrative. For example, a newspaper called “Busted 
Locals” publishes the mug shots, names, charges and sometimes 
addresses of people who have recently been arrested.264 The 
newspaper simply uses arrest records and mug shots to which the 
general public already has access.265 The content is successful and the 
print version sells out within days of appearing on store shelves.266 
Bustedmugshots.com claims to hold 5,364,864 arrest records,267 and 
the Busted Newspaper’s Facebook page has received over 23,200 
“likes.”268 
With many courts now making their criminal records available 
online, access to such records “is becoming the norm rather than the 
exception.”269 As the Uniform Law Commission notes, “Twenty years 
ago, an applicant might not have been asked for her criminal record 
when renting an apartment or applying for a job, and it would have 
been difficult for even an enterprising administrator to find, say, a 15 
year old, out-of-state, marijuana offense. Now, gathering this kind of 
information is cheap, easy and routine.”270 
 
 261. Michael H. Jagunic, Note, The Unified “Sealed” Theory: Updating Ohio’s Record-
Sealing Statute for the Twenty-First Century, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 161, 170-71 (2011) (citing 
James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 387, 401 (2006), who notes that “private companies specializing in background 
checks have the expertise and motivation to copy this information to their own databases”). 
 262. Id. at 170. 
 263. We use the term “criminal record” to refer to both records of arrest and conviction. 
 264. See BUSTED LOCALS, http://bustedlocals.com/advertising (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) 
(weekly print newspaper distributed for $1). Online subscription is also available for $26 per 
year. See BUSTED LOCALS, http://bustedlocals.com/subscribe-today (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) 
 265. Busted! Mission Statement, BUSTEDMUGSHOTS.COM, 
http://www.bustedmugshots.com/mission-statement (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 266. Mug Shot Newspaper Taps Nerve, Sells Well, KCTV5 KANSAS CITY NEWS (October 
26, 2010), http://www.kctv5.com/story/14794338/mug-shot-newspaper-taps-nerve-sells-well-
10-26-2010. 
 267. BUSTEDMUGSHOTS.COM, http://www.bustedmugshots.com (last visited Oct. 30. 
2012). 
 268. BUSTED NEWSPAPER, https://www.facebook.com/BustedNewspaper (last visited Oct. 
30, 2012). 
 269. Michael D. Mayfield, Comment, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing Information in 
the Information Age, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1997). 
 270. UCCCA, Prefatory Note, at 2; see generally James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration 
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1. Criminal Record Disclosure 
While criminal conviction records may severely impact 
numerous facets of an individual’s life,271 a mere arrest record—even 
an arrest not resulting in conviction—can also have devastating long 
term effects on the individual.272 To begin, there is an undoubted 
“social stigma” involved in an arrest record.273 It is considered 
“common knowledge that a [person] with an arrest record is much 
more apt to be subject to police scrutiny—the first to be questioned 
and the last eliminated as a suspect to an investigation.”274 If the 
person is subsequently arrested, his or her arrest record “may arise to 
haunt him in presentence reports, which often include not only prior 
convictions but also prior arrests.”275 Additionally, prosecutors use 
prior arrest records to decide to formally charge an accused or allow a 
juror to sit.276 Records of arrest are used by judges in making 
decisions as to sentencing, whether to grant bail, or whether to release 
pending appeal.277 
An individual may also suffer economic and personal harms if 
his or her arrest or conviction record (hereinafter “criminal record”) 
becomes known to employers, credit agencies, or even neighbors.278 
Criminal records can work “as a serious impediment and basis of 
discrimination in the search of employment, in securing professional, 
 
and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 387 (2006). 
 271. See, e.g., Journey v. State, 895 P.2d 955, 959 (Alaska 1995) (“The pernicious effects 
of criminal records are well documented. Courts, commentators, and legislatures have 
recognized that a person with a criminal record is often burdened by social stigma, subjected to 
additional investigation, prejudiced in future criminal proceedings, and discriminated against by 
prospective employers.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 272. Jagunic, supra note 261, at 162; see also Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our 
Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008). 
 273. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (noting that a record of arrest is a 
“record involving social stigma” (quoting United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895, 898 
(2d Cir. 1972))) . 
 274. Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (Colo. 1972) (en banc). 
 275. Id. (citing United States v. Cifarelli, 401 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
 276. Id. (citing Losavio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1972)). 
 277. E.g., Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (citing Rhodes v. 
United States, 275 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1960)) (record of arrests may be used to determine 
whether appellant may be released pending appeal); Cifarelli, 401 F.2d at 514 (citing United 
States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir. 1965)) (in imposing sentence, trial judge may 
consider evidence of other crimes for which defendant was not convicted); Jones v. United 
States, 307 F.2d 190, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (pre-sentence report may include, and judge may 
consider, records of charges not leading to convictions). 
 278. Dill, 503 P.2d at 159. 
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occupational, or other licenses, and in subsequent relations with the 
police and the courts.”279 Our legal system attempts to mitigate these 
attendant consequences in numerous ways. 
a. Sealing and Expungement 
The most obvious method for mitigating the harsh effects of 
criminal records is to limit their availability.280 Expungement and 
record sealing are two ways our legal system limits the availability of 
criminal records. While sometimes used interchangeably, “sealing” a 
record and “expunging” a record have different meanings from state 
to state. Generally, when a record is sealed it is removed from the 
main file of similar records and is no longer publicly accessible, but 
still physically exists.281 When a record is “expunged” it is usually 
deleted or erased, as appropriate for the record’s physical or electronic 
form or characteristic.282 This means, in theory, that the record is 
permanently irretrievable.283 
Record sealing and expungement practices developed from 
1940s era “specialized state sentencing schemes for youthful 
offenders.”284 These laws were adopted on the theory that youthful 
offenders should be given a special “incentive to reform” because 
they could more easily be rehabilitated than adults.285 The basic idea 
was to have a court restore social status as well as legal rights.286 
Expungement is not solely for the benefit of the juvenile offender, it 
is also in furtherance of protection of the public interest.287 Society 
has “a future interest in preventing ‘the deprived and delinquent 
children of today from becoming the deprived, inadequate, unstable 
and criminal citizens of tomorrow.’”288 
In 1962, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. Jagunic, supra note 261, at 179. 
 281. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.059 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 282. See, e.g., id. § .0585. 
 283. However, while expungement erases a criminal record, it does not necessarily require 
its destruction. State v. Savoie, 637 So. 2d 408, 410 (La. 1994); see also Love, supra note 200, 
at 1724-25 (discussing the drawbacks of various expungement statutes). 
 284. Love, supra note 200, at 1709. 
 285. Aidan R. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult 
Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 162 (1966). 
 286. Love, supra note 200, at 1709-10. 
 287. Blanchette & Johnson, supra note 140, at 37. 
 288. Id. (quoting PHILIP BEAN, PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL 
ENQUIRY 126 (1981)). 
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proposed a Model Act that would grant sentencing courts the 
authority to “annul” convictions in order to relieve offenders of the 
collateral effects of a criminal conviction.289 These efforts sparked the 
movement to reward ex-offenders for rehabilitation and eventually led 
to widespread criminal record-sealing and expungement statutes.290 
Expungement serves to protect an individual from the likely 
resulting hardships of an arrest record,291 particularly those who 
deserve a second chance or clean slate, such as those acquitted or 
exonerated.292 While state statutes vary greatly, expungement is 
sometimes presumptively available without a showing of 
extraordinary or extreme circumstances.293 The determination whether 
the expungement of arrest or other criminal records is appropriate 
involves balancing the harm to the individual against the utility to the 
government of maintaining such records.294 Courts routinely balance 
the personal harm to privacy interests and other adverse consequences 
against the public interest in keeping the records open.295 In some 
states, “offenders whose records have been expunged may deny that 
they were ever convicted.”296 It is by denying the existence of the 
expunged or sealed record—whether it is a record of a conviction or 
an arrest—that we forgive ex-offenders by permitting them to escape 
the consequences of the record.297 
Absent a statute, federal courts have recognized a narrow power 
to expunge the criminal records of a convicted individual where the 
 
 289. See Nat’l Council on Crime and Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction of Crime: A 
Model Act, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 97, 99 (1962). 
 290. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on 
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 155 (1999); see also 
Love, supra note 200, at 1710 (“The purpose of judicial expungement or set-aside was to both 
encourage and reward rehabilitation, by restoring social status as well as legal rights.”). 
 291. Commonwealth v. Butler, 672 A.2d 806, 808 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (citing 
Commonwealth v. Malone, 366 A.2d 584, 588 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976)). 
 292. Hoover v. State, 29 P.3d 591, 595 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting State v. 
McMahon, 959 P.2d 607, 609 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998)); Love, supra note 188, at 766 n.49 
(quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS Standard 23-
8.2 (Supp. 1986)) (proposing that expungement should “annul[ ] the fact of conviction and, thus, 
invalidate[ ] adverse actions taken . . . on the basis of the conviction”). 
 293. E.g., In re L.B., 848 A.2d 899, 904 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2004). 
 294. Livingston v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 78-79 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also 
Coles v. Levine, 561 F. Supp. 146, 153 (D. Md. 1983), aff’d, 725 F.2d 674 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 295. E.g., Hoover, 29 P.3d at 595 (citing McMahon, 959 P.2d at 609). 
 296. Love, supra note 200, at 1725 & nn.80-82 (citing numerous state laws addressing 
expungement). 
 297. See id. 
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governmental interest in retaining the individual’s records under the 
circumstances did not outweigh the individual’s interest in remaining 
free of the stigma of conviction.298 Additionally, under federal law 
expunged convictions are not counted when a court is evaluating an 
individual’s criminal history to compute the individual’s sentence 
after conviction.299 
Oftentimes, the ease of access and duplication of information 
inhibit expungement and record sealing from remedying the harsh 
consequences of the dissemination of criminal records.300 The 
difficulty is that, unless a court can exercise complete control over its 
records, it cannot ever hope to seal them.301 As one commentator 
notes, given today’s rapid proliferation of information, criminal trials 
and records would need to be removed from the public view 
altogether if one were going to effectively limit access to criminal 
records.302 This is the only way to preclude the proliferation of 
records in the digital world, but such Orwellian control of information 
is not an option.303 
Limiting the disclosure of criminal records information only 
goes so far—disclosure-based restrictions do not prevent the use of 
criminal record information once it is obtained. As previously 
emphasized, modern technology has greatly accelerated the 
proliferation of information that was once largely unavailable. As 
such, controlling the use of criminal records serves an important role 
in protecting privacy and mitigating undesirable effects of mass 
dissemination. 
b. Lowering Discrimination Barriers 
The proportion of the American population that has been 
 
 298. E.g., United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 395, 396 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 299. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(j) & cmt. 10 (2010). However, 
expunged convictions may be considered when determining whether an upward departure from 
the sentencing guidelines is warranted. Id. cmt. 3. 
 300. For an example of individuals that may be eligible to expunge or seal a record but 
whose information is disclosed at the point of arrest see sites like 
http://www.crowwingcriminals.com and http://www.mugshots.com. 
 301. See T. Markus Funk, A Mere Youthful Indiscretion? Reexamining the Policy of 
Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 885, 887 (1996) (noting 
that if a court cannot completely destroy (or seal) records, it cannot prevent future access to the 
records). 
 302. Mayfield, supra note 269, at 1068-69. 
 303. Id. at 1069. 
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convicted of a state or federal felony offense is growing.304 Society 
has a strong interest in seeing that individuals convicted of crimes can 
regain the legal status of ordinary citizens to prevent the creation of a 
permanent class of “internal exiles” who cannot establish themselves 
as law-abiding and productive members of the community.305 
A serious hurdle faced by ex-offenders is the employment 
discrimination they face due to their criminal records, which pervades 
both the public and private sector. Employers routinely run 
“background checks on current and prospective employees under 
advice from their lawyers or insurers not to take a risk on hiring 
someone with a criminal record, no matter how dated or minor the 
conviction.”306 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
permits employers to inquire about and consider both conviction 
records and arrest records when determining whether to hire an 
applicant.307 “Where there are two or more applicants for the same 
job, those with previous arrest records clearly stand in a less favorable 
position than do other applicants.”308 
Recognizing the long-lasting negative impact of a criminal 
record can have, a few states have enacted nondiscrimination laws to 
mitigate the negative impact these records can have on those seeking 
 
 304. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 224280, PRISONERS IN 2007, at 1 (2008). The U.S. prison population has 
increased dramatically since the early 1970s. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 197976, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. 
POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 1 (2003). In addition, to those serving or who have served prison 
time, an even larger proportion of the population has been convicted of a criminal offense 
without going to prison. Over four million adults were on probation in 2007, about twice as 
many as the number in jail or in prison. LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 224707, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2007: STATISTICAL TABLES at 1-2 (2009); see also PEW CENTER ON THE 
STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2009/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_
3-26-09.pdf. 
 305. Cf. Demleitner, supra note 290, at 153. 
 306. Love, supra note 188, at 772 (citing SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND 
CHECKING: CONDUCTING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 (2010) (finding ninety-two 
percent Society of Human Resources Management members surveyed perform criminal 
background checks on some or all job candidates, while seventy-three percent perform checks 
on all job candidates)). 
 307. See EEOC, NO. N-915-061, POLICY GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST 
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS 
AMENDED, 42 U.S.C. § 2000E ET SEQ. (1982), 1990 WL 1104708 (1990). 
 308. Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (Colo. 1972) (en banc). 
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employment.309 These nondiscrimination laws typically state that an 
employer cannot use a criminal record to deny employment or 
negatively discriminate against an individual based on the fact that an 
applicant has a criminal record.310 “The protection from 
discrimination is afforded to ex-offenders generally, with exceptions 
only where there is a ‘direct’ or ‘rational’ relationship between [his or 
her] particular conviction and the position for which the ex-offender 
has applied.”311 Additionally, some states “have attempted to impose 
limits on pre-employment inquiries”312 and some “are experimenting 
with so-called ‘ban-the-box’ schemes that postpone background 
checks until after a preliminary hiring decision has been made.”313 
Similar to the Bankruptcy Code’s antidiscrimination provisions, these 
statutory schemes promote forgiveness by attempting to mitigate 
negative attendant consequences when the existence or contents of a 
criminal record is exposed. 
2. Consumer Report Information and the FCRA 
Credit ratings are immensely important in modern life—
determining a person’s ability to buy a car, get favorable terms on a 
mortgage, or simply take advantage of the convenience of credit 
cards. Credit ratings were designed to predict which people would 
pay on time, and which people would likely default on loans.314 
Before they were regulated, credit bureaus used almost any 
information that could legally be obtained about an individual’s past 
as an indication of future behavior.315 For the sake of efficiency, they 
placed “special emphasis on seeking unfavourable or ‘derogatory’ 
information.”316 
 
 309. Hawaii, New York, and Wisconsin prohibit discrimination based on conviction in 
public and private employment as part of their fair employment laws. E.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW 
§ 752 (McKinney 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(a)(1) (2010); WIS. STAT. § 111.321 (2010). 
 310. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5 
(2010). Note that there is still the very difficult matter of enforcement. While employers may be 
prohibited from directly discriminating based on criminal records, they are not prohibited from 
obtaining the information. Employers can easily obtain and rely on criminal records and concoct 
explanations for discrimination, or simply offer no explanation when denying an applicant a 
position for which he or she has applied. Jagunic, supra note 261, at 174. 
 311. Jagunic, supra note 261, at 173. 
 312. Love, supra note 188, at 774. 
 313. Id. at 774-75 & n.97. 
 314. Blanchette & Johnson, supra note 140, at 37-38. 
 315. Id at 38. 
 316. Id. (quoting JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE 193 
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A major problem resulting from mass aggregation and 
dissemination of information is controlling information accuracy and 
relevancy. “Quality control of public records systems is notoriously 
poor, and mistakes are common.”317 The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 
1970 (FCRA),318 helps to protect individuals’ reputations319 by 
mitigating the dissemination of inaccurate information320 and 
preventing unwarranted invasions of privacy.321 It applies to private 
background screeners, among other entities.322 
The FCRA was enacted in order to establish reasonable 
procedures for meeting the credit reporting needs of commerce and 
the banking industry in a “manner which is fair and equitable to the 
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and 
proper utilization of such information.”323 The FCRA was essentially 
prompted by “congressional concern over abuses in the credit 
reporting industry.”324 As such, one of the main goals of the FCRA is 
to protect individuals from inaccurate or arbitrary information and 
preserve their creditworthiness and reputation.325 
The FCRA regulates people and entities that assemble or 
evaluate consumer report information and furnish that information to 
third parties.326 Consumer report information includes anything 
bearing on an individual’s credit worthiness, standing or capacity, 
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of 
living when such information is used (or is expected to be used) to 
determine the individual’s eligibility for credit, insurance, 
 
(1973)). 
 317. Love, supra note 188, at 773; see also OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 
(2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf (stating that FBI is 
“missing final disposition information for approximately fifty percent of its records”). 
 318. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2011). 
 319. Ackerley v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D. Wyo. 1974). 
 320. Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 362 F.3d 971, 982 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 321. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to the Credit Bureau of Greater Harrisburg, 594 F. Supp. 
229 (M.D. Pa. 1984). 
 322. See Love, supra note 188, at 773. 
 323. 15 U.S.C. § 1681; see also Matthiesen v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 173 F.3d 1242, 
1245 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 324. Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 962 (3rd Cir. 1996) (quoting Guimond v. 
Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 325. Ackerley v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D. Wyo. 1974); 
see also Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1261 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 326. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). 
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employment or other specific purposes.327 
Individuals and entities regulated under the FCRA are prohibited 
(with limited exceptions) from disseminating stale and obsolete 
information.328 For example, no consumer reporting agency may 
furnish a report containing information concerning certain bankruptcy 
cases more than ten years old, concerning civil suits or arrest records 
dating back more than seven years, or concerning paid tax liens, 
accounts placed for collection or charged to profit and loss.329 
Additionally, any other adverse item of information that casts the 
consumer in a negative or unfavorable light and antedates the report 
by more than seven years, other than a record of conviction of a 
crime, may not be disclosed.330 
In addition to the prohibitions on disclosure, an individual has 
the ability to dispute out-of-date information contained in his or her 
consumer report under the FCRA.331 The consumer reporting agency 
then has thirty days in which to determine whether the information is 
out-of-date; if it is, the information must be updated.332 Alternatively, 
if the agency cannot verify the information it has reported, it must 
delete the unverified item from its files.333 Either way, the consumer 
reporting agency must also promptly notify the source from which the 
information was obtained about the inaccurate information.334 
The FCRA’s prohibitions on the disclosure of stale and obsolete 
information are fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the 
confidentiality and relevancy of such information.335 Arming 
consumers with dispute remedies furthers this purpose while 
protecting social values of forgetfulness. 
 
 
 327. Id. § 1681a(d)(1). 
 328. Id. § 1681c(a)(1)-(4). 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. § 1681c(a)(5); see also Equifax Inc. v. FTC, 678 F.2d 1047, 1050 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(quoting In re Equifax Inc., 96 F.T.C. 844, 1980 WL 338977, at *2 (Dec. 15, 1980)) (defining 
“adverse information” as “information which may have, or may reasonably be expected to have, 
an unfavorable bearing on a consumer’s eligibility or qualifications for credit, insurance, 
employment, or other benefit, including information which may result, or which may be 
reasonably expected to result, in a denial of or increased costs for such benefits”). 
 331. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a). 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. § 1681. 
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3. Government Records and the FOIA Privacy 
Exemptions 
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA) is a law 
ensuring public access to U.S. government records.336 FOIA carries a 
presumption of disclosure; the burden is on the government—not the 
public—to substantiate why information may not be released.337 Upon 
written request, agencies of the United States government are required 
to disclose those records, unless they can be lawfully withheld from 
disclosure under one of nine specific FOIA exemptions.338 
Two exemptions that are driven by the policy goal of protecting 
individual privacy are Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Exemption 6 prohibits 
government agencies from disclosing “personnel and medical files 
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”339 Exemption 7(C) 
permits the government to withhold records or information compiled 
for law enforcement purposes from disclosure if release of such 
information “could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”340 These exemptions call 
on agencies and courts to protect “the personal privacy of citizens 
against the uncontrolled release of information compiled through the 
power of the State.”341 
Exemption 6 is both broader and narrower than Exemption 7(C). 
It is broader in that it applies to files “similar” to personnel or medical 
files, which the Supreme Court in United States Department of State 
v. Washington Post Co. interpreted to mean any detailed information 
in government files about a particular individual from which the 
identity of the individual can be discerned.342 Thus, records need not 
contain intimate details of a highly personal nature to be protected 
from disclosure.343 It is narrower in that it requires that the invasion of 
privacy be “clearly unwarranted”—the adverb “clearly” is omitted 
from Exemption 7(C).344 Additionally, whereas Exemption 6 refers to 
 
 336. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2011). 
 337. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 338. Id. § 552(b). 
 339. Id. § 552(b)(6). 
 340. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C). 
 341. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). 
 342. U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 89-1497, at 11 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2428). 
 343. Id. at 600. 
 344. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
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disclosures that “would constitute” an invasion of privacy, Exemption 
7(C) encompasses any disclosure that “could reasonably be expected 
to constitute” such an invasion.345 
The determination of the applicability of these exemptions 
involves weighing the public interest in disclosure of the information 
against the privacy interest in nondisclosure.346 This balancing test 
stems from the requirement that the invasion of personal privacy be 
an “unwarranted” one.347 On the privacy interest side, the more 
intimate the personal information the more protection it is given.348 
Some courts measure the “personal nature” of information by 
considering whether it reveals intimate or embarrassing details of an 
individual’s private life, as evaluated in terms of the “customs, mores, 
or ordinary views of the community.”349 The privacy interest 
protected by Exemption 7(C) extends beyond “the right to control 
information about oneself,”350 it extends to information about an 
individual which he or she could reasonably assert an option to 
withhold from the public at large because of its intimacy or its 
possible adverse effects upon oneself or one’s family.351 
Importantly, courts have recognized that individuals have a 
privacy interest in information that was once public but may have 
been “wholly forgotten.”352 As the Supreme Court noted in United 
States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press, “In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at 
one time or another divulged to another.”353 And continued,”[T]hat 
otherwise-private information may have been at one time or in some 
way in the ‘public’ domain does not mean that a person irretrievably 
loses his or her privacy interests in it.”354 The fact that “an event is not 
 
756 (1989). 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 762; see also Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762). 
 347. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (citing 
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762); see also Nadler v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 955 F.2d 1479, 
1487 (11th Cir. 1992) (same). 
 348. Favish, 541 U.S. at 166 (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773). 
 349. Herald Co. v. City of Bay City, 614 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Mich. 2000) (quoting Mager v. 
Dep’t of State Police, 595 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Mich. 1999)). 
 350. Favish, 541 U.S. at 165 (quoting respondent’s brief). 
 351. Id. at 169 (citations omitted). 
 352. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 769-70. 
 353. Id. at 763. 
 354. Halloran v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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wholly ‘private’ does not mean that an individual has no interest in 
limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information.”355 
The public interest side of the balance focuses on the FOIA’s 
central purpose of opening agency action to the light of public 
scrutiny and the value of the specific information at issue in 
furthering that purpose.356 In other words, the relevant public interest 
is the right of citizens “to be informed about what their government is 
up to.”357 When a private citizen is seeking information about another 
private citizen (for example, another person’s criminal record) and not 
about the activities of any agency, the public interest is at its low 
point and disclosure is likely unwarranted.358 
When Exemption 7(C) in play, it is the responsibility of the 
requester to establish a “sufficient reason for the disclosure.”359 Thus, 
a person requesting the protected information must show that (1) “the 
public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest 
more specific than having the information for its own sake” and (2) 
the information to be disclosed is “likely to advance that interest.”360 
Without this showing, the invasion of privacy is unwarranted and 
protected information is exempt from disclosure.361 Placing the 
burden on the party requesting protected information to show a public 
interest in its release is a marked exception to the general rule 
requiring the government to justify its need to withhold information 
from the public.362 This departure from the usual rule that “the citizen 
need not offer a reason for requesting the information” is necessary to 
the balance between privacy and disclosure.363 
While the FCRA and the FOIA exemptions may not provide for 
“forgiveness” as directly as sealing and expungement statutes, they 
strive to achieve similar goals. These statutes aim to protect 
 
 355. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 770 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Assoc. J. of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law 
Enforcement?, Nelson Timothy Stephens Lecture at the University of Kansas Law School (Sept. 
26-27, 1974), in 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1974)). 
 356. Id. at 772 (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)); see also 
King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 357. U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 495 (1994) (quoting 
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773). 
 358. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780. 
 359. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
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individuals—even those who have committed wrongs—from the 
negative consequences attendant with the disclosure of private 
information. In a sense the FCRA is forgiveness—it considers aged 
wrongs and indiscretions obsolete and prevents consumer reporting 
agencies from providing such information. So too are the FOIA 
exemptions forgiveness, limiting access to information that is 
generally “personal in character and potentially embarrassing or 
harmful if disclosed”364 thereby counteracting negative publicity and 
infamy.365 
IV. FORGIVENESS ELEMENTS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 
In Section 3, we examined laws and legal practices with a 
“forgiving nature” outside of the context of privacy. The right to be 
forgotten being crafted and evolved by European countries and the 
European Union derive from the recognition of information privacy 
rights in article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights366 
and article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.367 While the U.S. does not include privacy in the Constitution, 
the country does acknowledge legal forgiveness in a number of 
situations, as discussed in the previous section. In this section, we 
begin with an overview of the themes evident in those existing U.S. 
laws of forgiveness. We then propose a number of possible 
applications of the framework to create a U.S. legal approach to 
oblivion.368 
A. Thematic Network Analysis 
As previously discussed, we cannot simply build upon European 
principles of privacy to construct an American approach to 
forgiveness in the privacy context. To construct a legal tool that offers 
a form of forgiveness for past actions or provoked feelings 
represented digitally online that cause (allegedly) disproportionate 
harms, we first looked at how forgiveness has been institutionalized 
 
 364. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
770 (1989) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977)). 
 365. Bibas, supra note 51, at 334. 
 366. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/CONVENTION_ENG_WEB.pdf. 
 367. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 142, art. 7. 
 368. See supra, note 8 and accompanying text. 
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elsewhere in U.S. law. The forgiveness concepts, which are 
represented textually in a number of statutes and practices, were then 
scrutinized methodologically in order to construct a framework for 
qualitative analysis. Thematic network analysis offers a rigorous 
method of exploring and synthesizing the themes. Thematic networks 
summarize the main themes of a collection of texts into web-like 
structures through the systematic extraction of lowest-order premises 
evident in the text (basic themes), categories of basic themes grouped 
to summarize principles (organizing themes), and super-ordinate 
themes encompassing the text as a whole.369 Below, we describe the 
extracted themes, and explain how they can be used to develop and 
inform proposed legal solutions for oblivion. 
1. Prerequisites for Legal Forgiveness 
Our thematic network revealed three key factors which must be 
present before existing laws offer forgiveness: (1) a “forgivable” 
offense; (2) specific harms; and (3) social benefit. 
The laws we analyzed apply only to “forgivable” offenses. Each 
area of law carves out exemptions—some offenses are unforgivable. 
None of the described legal forgiveness measures extend to all 
circumstances. There are financial decisions one can make that will 
preclude filing for bankruptcy. Some criminal activity will never be 
considered for informational forgiveness, particularly ones with high 
recidivism rates and severe public concern (e.g., the sex offender list). 
Statutes of limitations do not exist for murder or manslaughter. Some 
things are simply too terrible to forget or forgive. Online 
informational forgiveness should be no different. Certain information 
about an individual, no matter how reformed, should not be 
disassociated with the individual. 
Legal forgiveness is not offered lightly. The individual harms 
must be those that are of similar degree and kind to those recognized 
by other forgiveness efforts. When an individual does not deserve 
punishment, pardons can end negative consequences and certify good 
character.370 Unfair prejudices are softened by forgiveness laws 
addressing financial limitations or denial of access to services created 
by information.371 When inaccurate information related to an 
 
 369. Jennifer Attride-Stirling, Thematic Networks: An Analytic Tool for Qualitative 
Research, 1 QUALITATIVE RES. 385, 388 (2001). 
 370. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 371. See supra Part III. 
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individual may limit opportunities, pardons and the FCRA offer 
solutions.372 Much of the writing on these laws also addresses the 
psychiatric and relational harms that create more hurdles for the 
individual. While social stigma is discussed in all of the above as 
severe, it is not always a harm acted upon because of overriding 
public interests. 
The amount of information that resides on the Web, and the 
harms that stem from pervasive search practices, may both well be 
sufficiently damaging to warrant legal intervention. The information 
is heavily relied upon by prospective professional and social contacts. 
Currently, 79% of employers,373 20% of universities, and 40% of law 
schools search applicants online.374 Searching an individual’s name 
using Google to size him or her up is an increasingly common 
practice and will likely be more so with the adoption of smart phones. 
The practice is so common that expectant parents now consider how 
search results for their future child’s name will impact the child’s 
life.375 Parents search prospective names to help their kids retrieve top 
search results, and only a few rare parents want their children to be 
“lost in a virtual crowd.”376 With 92% of U.S. children under the age 
of two holding an online presence, “[l]ife, it seems, begins not at birth 
but with online conception. And a child’s name is the link to that 
permanent record.”377 
Searching for an individual is done for many different reasons, 
and more and more information is freely disclosed. But though the 
harm from information that resides online is severe, this harm not 
necessarily pervasive. Not everyone has his or her ill-fated 
relationship, prior arrests, or embarrassing photo posted online. In The 
Future of Reputation, law professor and privacy expert Daniel Solove 
detailed a number of horror stories about the harsh retribution handed 
 
 372. See supra Parts III.A.2, III.B.2. 
 373. The Real-World Effect of Online Reputation Management, REPUTATION.COM, 
http://www.reputation.com/how_to/the-real-world-effects-of-online-reputation-management 
(last visited July 2, 2012). 
 374. Paulina Firozi, Law School Admissions Use Facebook, Google to Screen Applicants, 
Study Finds, DAILY NW. (Oct. 30, 2011), 
http://dailynorthwestern.com/2011/10/30/blogs/oncampus/law-school-admissions-use-facebook-
google-to-screen-applicants-study-finds. 
 375. Allen Salkin, What’s in a Name? Ask Google, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/fashion/google-searches-help-parents-narrow-down-baby-
names.html?_r=2&ref=technology. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
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out by Web users in reaction to personal information found online.378 
It is easy to sympathize with the difficulties created by regretful and 
embarrassing moments coming up first on a Google search for our 
name, but many of us only imagine such horror—we are not 
personally suffering such a fate. In considering the institutionalization 
of a forgiveness policy, a level of both severity and pervasiveness 
may be necessary. 
Finally, legal forgiveness depends on some social benefit in 
addition to supporting a harmed individual. We see a weighing of 
interests, and requiring social benefit in a variety of contexts. 
Bankruptcy offers a fresh start for those that file, but it also benefits 
creditors. It removes the competitive nature of collection among 
creditors and enables collection across state lines.379 In addition to the 
debtors and creditors, bankruptcy promotes social interests in the 
form of means for responding to periodic national financial crises.380 
Juveniles that accumulate a criminal record are often granted 
forgiveness not just to protect the youth population, but also to 
cultivate and protect society’s future, decrease recidivism, and limit 
costs of committing individuals for essentially lifetimes. The social 
benefits of attaining credit to purchase everything from homes to 
electronics are economic, but inhibit credit evaluators from using any 
and all data to predict future payment. While some are disadvantaged 
by these laws, social benefit trumps those interests. 
In considering legal approaches to oblivion, it is essential to 
evaluate and articulate the benefit to society as a whole.381 
Forgiveness laws in general offer great comfort. We, as a population, 
exert a sigh of relief knowing that certain violations do not remain on 
our record forever or that bankruptcy is an option when debt leaves us 
in ruin. Digital forgiveness is no different. A way to prevent being 
forever branded by a piece of negative information retrieved by a 
search engine would probably quell many of our fears of the digital 
 
 378. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET passim (2007). One of the stories is about the “dog poop girl,” a young woman 
who refused to clean up after her dog in a South Korean subway train and suffered severe social 
shaming that resulted in her withdrawing from University. Id. at 1-2. 
 379. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE 
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 20 (1989). 
 380. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 64 (1935). 
 381. See generally PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL 
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995) (discussing the social importance of privacy, and arguing 
the necessity of addressing its benefits in policy debate). 
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age and perhaps make us freer individuals, more willing to participate 
in open public discourse. Addressing old information can also benefit 
the searcher. When old information no longer represents a person it is 
inaccurate and less valuable, particularly when it is presented out of 
context. Increasing information quality benefits the subject, the 
reader, and society as a whole. As time reveals the severity of the 
injustices that result from information transparency and accessibility, 
the need for remedies will be acutely felt. 
2. Elements of a Legal Approach to Forgiveness 
When the prerequisites to legal forgiveness have been satisfied, 
thematic analysis reveals three key elements of legal approaches to 
forgiveness: (1) time; (2) oversight; and (3) relief from accountability. 
Time is an important aspect of each of the existing legal 
forgiveness measures. It helps to ensure that any relief is appropriate, 
and has been earned. For instance, sealing and expunging a juvenile 
criminal record occurs upon entry into the adult world.382 Pardon or 
parole boards consider certification of good behavior after a set 
amount of time, generally five years after an individual has completed 
a criminal sentence.383 Similarly, when negative information is more 
than seven years old, the FCRA prevents its consideration, with 
exceptions for certain bankruptcy issues and criminal records.384 
Immunity from suit attaches only after the statutorily proscribed 
period of limitations, which correlates with the severity of the offense. 
The element of time adds reassurance that relief is both deserved and 
appropriate. 
Thus, restoring an individual who is the subject of negative 
information must account for time. The individual must be 
accountable for actions or interactions for some period of time before 
restoration becomes appropriate. Outside of the legal context, the time 
it takes to forgive an indiscretion depends on the indiscretion. In the 
legal context, it appears more suitable to require standardized sets of 
time before allowing for categories of information forgiveness. 
In addition to incorporating time, a legal approach to forgiveness 
must incorporate the correct level of oversight by a decision-maker. 
The level of oversight necessary depends on the underlying offenses, 
harms, and societal interests. With the FCRA, relief is applied 
 
 382. See supra Part III.B.1.a. 
 383. See supra Part III.A.2.a. 
 384. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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automatically, but disputes may be heard by the judiciary.385 Statutes 
of limitations apply broadly to categories of offenses, but courts make 
determinations with respect to when the periods of limitations begins 
and whether the facts of a particular case warrant tolling or 
exemptions.386 Bankruptcy, pardons, and expungement require a 
decision-maker to make case-by-case determinations of whether 
forgiveness is appropriate.387 Without organized oversight, any right 
to be forgotten structure will be highly susceptible to manipulation. 
When forgiveness or forgetfulness is sought with respect to 
information that has been rightfully disclosed, a legal approach must 
consider the public’s right to access that information. Any legal 
mechanism for forgetting information will require the correct level of 
oversight of by a decision-maker to weigh the harms and benefits to 
individuals and to society as a whole. 
Thematic network analysis of existing laws reveals a final 
common element: relief from accountability. Our legal system 
acknowledges that punishment should not necessarily be eternal, and 
that limiting the use of information about that individual can be used 
as a form of relief. In a sense, limiting the use of information can 
determine which sectors of society must not hold an individual 
accountable. This determination depends on the severity of the harm 
and its directed impact. Bankruptcy, the FCRA, and state employment 
discrimination statutes limit what and how information can be used to 
judge someone in certain situations. For instance, filing for 
bankruptcy relieves the individual of debt, and also insures that public 
and private employers cannot discriminate based on the filing.388 
Relief in the form of an expunged or sealed record, if not otherwise 
disclosed, limits access to information about her offense, and offers 
the individual relief from legal and social stigma. Importantly, none 
of the existing legal schemes limit all use of the information by all 
parties. 
Existing laws also offer relief from accountability by adjusting 
information. Appropriate information adjustment must be nuanced. 
Data can be added to the existing body of information related to an 
individual to provide a broader context for the individual represented 
in the information. For example, certifications of rehabilitation or 
 
 385. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 386. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 387. See supra Part III. 
 388. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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good behavior provided by state entities in the case of pardons and 
periods of law-abiding behavior supplement existing information.389 
The old information does not go away; it is simply enriched and 
contextualized as part of an individual’s past. 
One must earn relief from accountability. Bankruptcy offers 
relief, but at the price of social scrutiny. Sealed records require the 
price of punishment, time, and good behavior. Statutes of limitations 
require a period of time without continued bad conduct as evidence of 
self-rehabilitation. Existing relief from accountability is narrowly 
tailored to situations where the price paid by the individual 
compensates for the wrong committed. 
These types of relief from accountability can inform the 
development of new legal approaches to oblivion. Relief in this 
context could take the form of limiting how, by whom, and for what 
purpose information can be used. It could also involve the limited 
adjustment of online information. Similar to the way the market has 
addressed online reputational harms, adding more information can 
limit the weight given to negative information. This notion also fits 
with the marketplace of ideas, a foundational First Amendment 
concept. The truth will arise from the competition of ideas or as 
Thomas Jefferson explained it, “[T]his institution will be based on the 
illimitable freedom of the human mind. for [sic] here we are not 
afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so 
long as reason is left free to combat it.”390 Inaccurate, flawed, or low 
value information can be combated with more information. 
In the case of past personal information found online, an 
individual seeking relief from accountability must pay some price to 
obtain it. The punishment of years of social scrutiny may be enough, 
but in instances where social norms have been harshly violated, such 
as violent criminal actions, or when social utility still exists, such as 
consumer protection, special rules may need to be instituted on top of 
the demand of time. Additionally or alternatively, one could earn 
relief through proven rehabilitation. It must be determined that relief 
from accountability for old information that identifies an individual is 
appropriate under a specific set of circumstances. 
 
 389. See supra Parts III.A, III.B. 
 390. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Roscoe (Dec. 27, 1820), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/75.html. 
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B. Toward a Suitable Approach to Oblivion in the U.S. 
With the above thematic network in mind, we propose a number 
of possible directions that the U.S. legal system could take to deal 
with pervasive lingering personal information online that causes 
individuals to be significantly hindered in life. Assuming the 
prerequisites for legal action are met, each must account for a period 
of time in which the information should reside publicly, formal 
oversight at some point to determine appropriateness of the 
complaint, and means of information adjustment or limited use. The 
following proposals are presented in order of increasing retention of 
content. 
The first possibility would eliminate all information about a 
person after a period of time, a solution proposed by law professor 
Jonathan Zittrain called reputation bankruptcy.391 Zittrain expects 
difficult-to-shed indicators of identity will include collections of 
biological information, photos, locations and times of day, tipping 
practices, tracked license plates revealing driving habits, etc.392 These 
indicators will provide opportunity for others to contribute judgments 
to an aggregated reputation profile or score. Reputation bankruptcy 
would create a clean slate for our digital selves: people should be able 
to de-emphasize or entirely delete old information that has been 
generated, such as political preferences, embarrassing actions, and 
youthful opinions, to avoid the inhibitions resulting from every action 
ending up on one’s permanent record.393 Zittrain also suggests that 
this should probably include the cost of bankruptcy, a stigma created 
by the removal of all information, both good and bad.394 Reputation 
bankruptcy certainly meets the criteria of time and relief from 
accountability, but removing all information on an individual might 
deprive society of more information than is necessary to cure the 
harm and does not account for unforgivable violations. 
A second possibility is to limit the use of personal information. 
Legislatures could enact laws that limit a potential employers’ ability 
to search for or consider online information about a potential 
applicant that is older than a designated period.395 An employer may 
 
 391. JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 228-29 
(2008). 
 392. Id. at 219-20. 
 393. Id. at 228-29. 
 394. Id. at 229. 
 395. Paul Ohm, a law professor at the University of Colorado Law School, has argued that 
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have an interest in how an employee reflects upon the company to the 
world through a search engine, but less of an interest in how he or she 
reflects upon the company to a smaller group of connected people on 
Facebook. An employer digging around in applicants’ social media 
profiles that are not publicly available is different than an employer 
searching for public information easily retrievable through a Google 
search. Thus, laws might distinguish between searching publicly 
available information, and seeking to obtain information only 
available through social networks or other more private spheres. 
A third option is to make personal information less accessible. A 
legal claim that would allow subjects to have their name removed 
from a webpage or the specific content’s URL removed from a search 
index would also be a possible solution. This approach aligns with the 
Spanish version of the “Right to Be Forgotten.”396 If digital search 
results could be “expunged” or deleted from the source, harms to the 
subject would be prevented, but would also be irretrievable to the 
public.  
Unlike the United States, some European countries provide a 
system for removal of content online. For example, Spanish citizens 
may file a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection Agency, where 
the claim is assessed and if appropriate, the agency will order Google 
to remove the URL from its index if content creators refuse to edit 
their content.397 Currently, the U.S. does not have a data agency to 
hear or enforce such citizen requests. It is generally up to an 
individual to enforce his or her privacy rights. A cause of action 
inspired by Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA)398 
takedown notice regime may be most suitable.399 Such a cause of 
action would incorporate each of the above themes and serve as 
means for the law to “encourage informal attempts at resolving 
privacy disputes.”400 The tort would establish a system which allows 
 
it should be illegal for employers to fire or refuse to hire individuals for legal activities 
performed off duty discovered on social networking sites or search engine results. Jeffrey 
Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at MM30, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=all. 
 396. Ciaran Giles, Spain Launches First “Right to Be Forgotten” Case Against Google, 
HUFFINGTON POST (April 20, , 9:32 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/21/right-to-
be-forgotten-google-spain_n_851891.html. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 28-60 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 399. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2011). 
 400. SOLOVE, supra note 378, at 190. 
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an individual to send a request to remove certain types of information 
after the passage of time. If such a request is unreasonably ignored, 
the tort would allow the individual to bring suit to remove the 
information. 
After a certain amount of time, if an individual chooses to 
exercise a claim to oblivion, she can contact a site publishing the 
information, specify the URL and request action by the site operator. 
The operator of the site should be given flexibility to limit 
infringement on expression rights, and has the option to (1) remove 
the identifying information; (2) delete the entry completely; or (3) un-
index the page. The site operator may not have received hits on old 
content in years, have no interest in keeping the content, and be 
willing to delete the content. Alternatively, the site can choose to alter 
only the identification of the person, removing his or her full name. 
The site could also make the content inaccessible to the public, but 
still maintain the record in to avoid issues of deleting potentially 
useful information. 
This scheme is particularly plausible, given that it has been 
voluntarily implemented by certain sites. For instance, 
Public.Resource.org, a site that publishes court records, evaluates 
requests to remove these records from search engine results.401 If 
Public.Resource.org finds limited access appropriate, it uses a 
robots.txt file402 to prevent the content stored on its server to be 
published in search engine results in order to protect the privacy of 
the requester. Ethical crawlers that build the index of search engine 
page results will not crawl pages specified by the site in the robots.txt 
file.403 The documents still exist on Public.Resource.org’s server and 
a researcher or journalist looking for court records can find them by 
going directly to the URL http://bulk.resource.org/robots.txt. All of 
the search engine-blocked cases’ URLs are listed and can be easily 
accessed. But, the documents will not be retrieved by a search engine 
search for information on a certain person. 
As in the DMCA, if a site owner or operator feels that 
identifying the individual is important, it can challenge the take-down 
 
 401. Why Is My Court Case on the Internet?, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, 
https://public.resource.org/court_cases.html (last visited July 2, 2012). 
 402. About /robots.txt, GET /ROBOTS.TXT, http://www.robotstxt.org/robotstxt.html (last 
visited July 2, 2012). 
 403. See http://bulk.resource.org/robots.txt for a list of files “disallowed” for crawlers by 
Public.Resource.Org. 
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notice before a formal decision-maker, giving the scheme oversight. 
If newsworthy information404 continues to be relevant405 and cannot 
be communicated without identifying the individual,406 it should 
 
 404. While the public disclosure of private facts tort is not fit to handle forgetting, because 
it punishes the publication of truthful information that is private and not of concern to the public 
interest, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977), tests developed by the First and 
Tenth Circuit provide a useful analysis for the right to be forgotten, but generally the 
newsworthiness test has failed to provide privacy protection. The U.S. Supreme Court has not 
decided the constitutionality of the public disclosure tort. In 1967, the Supreme Court 
recognized newsworthiness as defense to privacy claims involving true disclosures in Time, Inc. 
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), and The 
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), the Court narrowly decided the issue of whether 
information obtained from the public domain subsequently published by the press created 
liability under the public disclosure tort favorably for the press. A few jurisdictions do not 
recognize the tort and five jurisdictions have rejected it completely. See Geoff Dendy, Note, The 
Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort, 85 KY. L.J. 147, 158 (1997). Other 
jurisdictions defer to the press to determine newsworthiness. See id. at 159 (citing Diane L. 
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’ Privacy Tort, 68 
CORNELL L. REV. 291, 353 (1983)). A user, whether press or not, publishing information 
arguably verifies its public interest. The long tail of the Internet allows for a market for every 
piece of information. Attorney Jacqueline Rolfs has said “the newsworthiness defense engulfs 
the tort of public disclosure because, to a large extent, the media themselves determine what is 
newsworthy.” Jacqueline R. Rolfs, Notes, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning of the End 
for the Tort of Public Disclosure, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1107, 1121 (1990). 
 405. Law professor Lior Jacob Strahilevitz explained how social networks theory can 
provide a methodology for determining whether private information shared by the plaintiff with 
the defendant would have been widely disseminated, regardless of the defendant’s actions. Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (2005). 
There are many variables that can be used to predict whether information will be widely 
disseminated, many of which relate to the nature of the information—its newsworthiness. Id. at 
970-72. Understanding dissemination can also help determine whether information is still 
newsworthy. By using time and technology, the continued public concern or newsworthiness of 
the contested content can be assessed. The hit count of the page where the content resides can be 
calculated for specified dates. Google Trends, http://www.google.com/trends, allows users to 
track and compare search terms during select time periods. 
 406. Some courts have taken into account that information can be newsworthy but 
communicated without personally identifying an individual. The Fifth Circuit developed a test 
that requires a logical nexus between the plaintiff and the content of legitimate public interest. 
Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (logical nexus must 
exist between the complaining individual and matter of legitimate public interest). See also 
Nobles v. Cartwright, 659 N.E.2d 1064, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (disclosure of private facts is 
of legitimate public interest “only if it was substantially relevant and closely related to a matter 
or an event which was of legitimate public interest”); Anonsen v. Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 
704 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (acknowledging that factual questions may be presented about the 
newsworthiness of private facts unrelated to general newsworthy topics); Bonome v. Kaysen, 
No. 032767, 2004 WL 1194731, at *5 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2004) (“Thus, otherwise private 
information may properly be published when it is sufficiently related to a broader topic of 
legitimate public concern.”). The Tenth Circuit adopted this test, but described the logical nexus 
as “substantial relevance,” meaning that the individual must be substantially relevant to the 
published content. Alvarado v. KOB-TV, LLC, 493 F.3d 1210, 1220 n.9 (10th Cir. 2007) 
 
AMBROSE FRIESS VANMATRE 12/10/2012  1:56 PM 
2012] SEEKING DIGITAL REDEMPTION 161 
remain, but the digital age requires a closer look at newsworthiness 
than this article can offer. When information is no longer important to 
anyone except the individual it is harming,407 takedown notices may 
be the appropriate mechanism for addressing toxic information and 
reestablishing social forgetting.408 
 
(“However, we observe that state law now defines torts involving publication to take into 
account First Amendment restrictions announced by the Supreme Court.”). The newsworthiness 
test established by these courts reinforces the notion that just because a story is of legitimate 
public concern does not mean that the plaintiff’s identity is necessary to disclose. Solove 
compares two cases involving a rare disease and a violent car wreck. The “Starving Glutton” 
case, or Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942), involved a woman that ate endlessly 
but continued to lose weight and claimed she was unnecessarily identified by the press that 
covered her rare disease. SOLOVE, supra note 378, at 133 (citing Barber, 159 S.W.2d at 295). 
The court found the information newsworthy, but the plaintiff’s identity was not newsworthy. 
The Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc. court, on the other hand, refused to make this 
determination regarding a woman who was identified by the news in association with a 
horrendous car crash. Id. (citing Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)). 
The court stated: “That the broadcast could have been edited to exclude some of Ruth’s words 
and images and still excite a minimum degree of viewer interest is not determinative. Nor is the 
possibility that the members of this or another court, or a jury, might find a differently edited 
broadcast more to their taste or even more interesting. The courts do not, and constitutionally 
could not, sit as superior editors of the press.” Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488. 
 407. In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), the Court outlined a concept of “practical obscurity” for interpreting 
FOIA disclosures that fell under the privacy protections in Exemptions 6 and 7(C). It is well-
established that time will not diminish the applicability of 7(C), even for law enforcement 
records of past crimes now criticized by the public. See, e.g., Ray v. FBI, 441 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35 
(D.D.C. 2006) (rejecting argument that passage of time and retirement of FBI Special Agents 
diminish their privacy interests); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 297 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“Confidentiality interests cannot be waived through . . . the passage of time.”); McDonnell v. 
United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1256 (3rd Cir. 1993) (deciding that passage of forty-nine years does 
not negate individual’s privacy interest); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 566 n.21 (1st Cir. 
1993) (finding effect of passage of time upon individual’s privacy interests to be “simply 
irrelevant”); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concluding that passage of 
more than thirty years irrelevant when records reveal nothing about government activities). The 
“practical obscurity” concept “expressly recognizes that the passage of time may actually 
increase the privacy interest at stake when disclosure would revive information that was once 
public knowledge but has long since faded from memory.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 579 (2009) (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 767 (“[O]ur 
cases have also recognized the privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of certain 
information even when the information may at one time have been public.”); Rose v. Dep’t of 
the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that “a person’s privacy may be as 
effectively infringed by reviving dormant memories as by imparting new information”) 
(Exemption 6), aff’d, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 903 
F. Supp. 131, 133 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding that passage of thirty or forty years “may actually 
increase privacy interests, and that even a modest privacy interest will suffice” to protect 
identities)), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption7c.pdf. 
 408. Sometimes the past becomes news later. William James Sidis, a child prodigy turned 
adult recluse, sued for violations to his privacy after two publications circulated “Where Are 
They Now?” pieces, but did not win because of his prior status as a public figure which created 
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Finally, information can be added to the harmful content to add 
context and accuracy to the information. A time frame can be added 
to false light claims, which offer the plaintiff the opportunity to 
correct old, online information that causes harm, can simply add a 
timeframe. When someone suffers the financial, social, or personal 
harms of truthful information from his or her past, a false light claim 
would ensure that the information is presented as old. Requiring web 
pages to include an accurate time stamp of when the content was 
created would allow technology to be layered to discourage digging 
around in old personal information in inappropriate circumstances. 
For instance, a search for an individual could be limited to time 
stamped content within the last five years. An individual should be 
able to demand that old information be marked as such, and not 
mislead potential viewers. 
Like the examples of institutional forgiveness analyzed above, 
the above claims should not be allowed for unforgiveable categories 
of information. For instance, it may be determined that violent, 
sexual, or fraud-related criminal convictions are not the type of 
information that may be institutionally forgiven—removal of that 
information could endanger public safety. Additionally, information 
related to professional conduct also may be exempt from oblivion 
relief until the professional is no longer practicing in the field. Other 
categories of information may not need to wait any period of time. 
Disclosure of information such as social security numbers should be 
placed back into a private sphere immediately upon request. 
CONCLUSION 
Forgiveness, the decision to forgo negative feelings, retribution, 
or vengeance, produces a wide range of individual and social 
benefits—but relies on fading memories. Advances in search 
 
considerable public interest. Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). Resurrected 
news is difficult to manage legally. The right to be forgotten could be exercised after a certain 
time period starting from when the offense occurred or when the news about the event occurred. 
Starting the clock of at the time the information was made public, as opposed to the event’s 
occurrence, allows for important resurrected information to become part of the public discourse. 
Resurrections should be distinguished from malicious exposures. Because resurrection is 
important to historians, journalists, and researchers, unindexing, as opposed to deletion, is 
another option to support social forgiving and the right to be forgotten. When an appropriate 
user request is received by a site manager, he or she can choose to prevent the page from being 
crawled. Instead of editing our history, we can simply make it harder to find. It would be similar 
to a library that can hold an infinite number of objects (books, journals, newspapers, art, movies, 
music) but operates on the old card catalog system. 
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algorithms, information seeking behavior, content creation and 
management practices, and decreasing costs of electronic storage 
capacity threaten to erode societal forgetting. In other legal contexts, 
the U.S. has institutionalized forgiving and forgetting in rare instances 
when the harms to individuals are severe, social benefits are 
articulated, and that which is forgivable is distinguished from that 
which is not. Relief from accountability may be offered after a certain 
amount of hardship is born by the individual for a period of time and 
formal oversight can be provided. Permitting digital labels to 
permanently attach to individuals contradicts notions of reinvention, 
which lie at the heart of U.S. national identity. Oblivion in the digital 
age is not impossible. Code, norms, and markets may offer partial 
solutions, but a complete approach to privacy in this context may 
require legal support. We have proposed four possible directions 
toward oblivion: reputation bankruptcy, limited use of the information 
by employers, an oblivion take-down regime similar to the DMCA 
system, and a false light claim to add context. We believe it is 
important that forgiveness follow us into the new Information Age 
and encourage further research in the area. 
